[EM] Two round Condorcet / Improved TRS
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-elmet at munsterhjelm.no
Sat Oct 12 02:54:05 PDT 2024
On 2024-10-12 03:24, Chris Benham wrote:
>> "While even the paradigm of IRV retains this "few first preferences -
>> not legitimate" view, ..."
>
> No. it works the way it does because there isn't any other way of fixing
> FPP's failure of Clone-Winner while keeping compliance with
> Later-no-Help and Later-no-Harm.
Do you mean that it's the only method that can have those three
properties, or that it's the only FPP-based method?
If the latter, it would be interesting to know (in a theory sense) if
there exists a method that passes all three and has fewer strategic
nomination problems than IRV.
-km
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