[EM] More on Wiki

[Closed Limelike Curves]

My point is just that describing one particular system as "the most
proportional", without first defining what is meant by "proportional" or
even offering an argument for this position is ridiculous.

On the Condorcet dominance theorems: these are just straightforward results
about how replacing a ranked voting rule X with Condorcet//X makes that
voting rule "strictly better" in some way, e.g. always being more resistant
to spoilers or strategic voting.

On Thu, Oct 3, 2024 at 5:43 PM Rob Lanphier <roblan at gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi CLC,
>
> For what it's worth, you're probably not going to find anyone that will
> help you dispute whether STV is "the most proportional".  Intuitively, it
> seems to do a pretty good job with proportionality.  I haven't read the
> Maskin paper nor the Merrill paper (and I'm not about to anytime soon), but
> can you explain why you believe that claim is so outrageous?
>
> Rob
>
>
> On Mon, Sep 16, 2024 at 11:38 AM Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> *STV has also been described as the most proportional system.[21]:83 *The
>>> system tends to handicap extreme candidates because, to gain preferences
>>> and so improve their chance of election, candidates need to canvass voters
>>> beyond their own circle of supporters, and so need to moderate their
>>> views.[25][26] Conversely, widely respected candidates can win election
>>> with relatively few first preferences by benefitting from strong
>>> subordinate preference support.[19]
>>>
>> This is on Wikipedia. This sentence alone has probably been read more
>> times than every article on ElectoWiki combined. The bar is low, guys.
>> (Lower than the bar on ElectoWiki, to be honest.)
>>
>> Does anyone want to do something about it? Take the theorems from
>> Campbell, Kelly, and Maskin here:
>> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0165176511001972
>>
>> https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/maskin/files/strategy-proofness_iia_and_majority_rule_manuscript_04.03.2020.pdf
>>
>> So. What you have here is a mathematical proof that everyone on this
>> mailing list is completely right about everything. IRV and other
>> non-Condorcet ranked methods are just plain worse than Condorcet. These
>> results are well-known and well-cited, and show there's no reason anyone
>> should ever use RCV as anything but a Condorcet tiebreaker. The proofs are
>> intuitive and literally one sentence long.
>>
>> And yet there were zero words on this in Wikipedia before the start of
>> this year, when I added the description to the article on Arrow's theorem!
>> There's *still* no article on the Condorcet dominance theorems! (I
>> haven't had time to write one, unfortunately.)
>>
>> I feel like I'm going crazy. There's so much important information that
>> nobody's even *trying* to communicate to the average person!
>>
>> Special thanks to @Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de> for his
>> past improvements to the spoiler effect article, and to @Richard, the
>> VoteFair guy <electionmethods at votefair.org> who's provided a bit of help
>> the past few months.
>>
> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
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