[EM] Strategy-free criterion

[Closed Limelike Curves]

OK, so SFC prevents offensive truncation from defeating the Condorcet
winner, while minimal defense provides a simple way to stop order-reversal?

On Fri, May 31, 2024 at 4:01 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Evidently, then,  SFC merely says that the candidate can’t win without
> order-reversal, while Minimal-Defense says he can’t win at all if the
> minimal defensive-strategy is used.
>
> It seems to me that Eppley’s Minimal-Defense was the votes-only criterion
> based on SDSC.
>
> …& that SDSC was the original, preference-&-sincerity version.
>
> I preferred preference-&-sincerity because of its universal applicability,
> where votes-only had to stipulate a balloting.
>
> On Fri, May 31, 2024 at 12:33 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>
>> Why are we having a public discussion about a voting method criterion
>> without anyone giving its definition, and with apparently most of the
>> participants in the discussion knowing nothing about it besides its name?
>>
>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Strategy-free_criterion
>>
>> The *strategy-free criterion* is a voting system criterion
>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> for evaluating voting
>> systems <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system>.
>> Definitions
>>
>> A sincere vote is one with no falsified preferences or preferences left
>> unspecified when the election method allows them to be specified (in
>> addition to the preferences already specified).
>>
>> One candidate is preferred over another candidate if, in a one-on-one
>> competition, more voters prefer the first candidate than prefer the other
>> candidate.
>>
>> If one candidate is preferred over each of the other candidates, that
>> candidate is called "Condorcet candidate" or "Condorcet winner".
>> Statement of criterion
>>
>> If a Condorcet candidate exists, and if a majority prefers this candidate
>> to another candidate, then the other candidate should not win if that
>> majority votes sincerely and no other voter falsifies any preferences.
>>
>> In a ranked method, it is nearly equivalent to say:
>>
>> If more than half of the voters rank *x* above *y*, and there is no
>> candidate *z* whom more than half of the voters rank above *x*, then *y* must
>> not be elected.
>>
>>
>> I think this evolved into the Minimal Defense criterion, the "votes-only
>> version" of which says that if more than half the voters vote A over B and
>> B no higher than equal-bottom then B can't win.
>>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 31/05/2024 9:46 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>
>> Some time ago, I wrote a criterion that I called Strategy-Free-Criterion
>> (SFC).
>>
>> Is that what you were referring to?
>>
>> It was about a circumstance in which wv Condorcet is strategy-free. At
>> that time, autodeterence hadn’t been considered.
>>
>> SFC didn’t catch-on, & I haven’t heard mention of it lately, & so I don’t
>> know it’s definition. But wv Condorcet is strategy-free in a meaningful
>> sense.
>>
>> On Fri, May 31, 2024 at 05:07 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, May 29, 2024 at 14:15 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com>
>>> Ppwrote:
>>>
>>>> I'm trying to work out how the strategy-free criterion actually relates
>>>> to strategy, because it just sounds like it means the majority-Condorcet
>>>> criterion ("if a candidate majority-beats every other, they have to win if
>>>> everyone is honest"). @Michael Ossipoff ?
>>>>
>>>  Closed, isn’t “Strategy-Free Criterion” your new name for FBC.
>>>
>>> It’s a very inaccurate name. FBC-complying methods aren’t strategy-free
>>> in any sense.
>>>
>>>  But they’re free of any need for *drastic* defensive strategy
>>> (favorite-burial or any defensive order-reversal).
>>>
>>> You want strategy-free? The wv Condorcet methods, such as RP(wv) &
>>> MinMax(wv), are strategy-free in a meaningful sense…effectively free of
>>> need for any defensive strategy…due to their autodeterence.
>>>
>>
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