[EM] Strategy-free criterion

[Michael Ossipoff]

Evidently, then,  SFC merely says that the candidate can’t win without
order-reversal, while Minimal-Defense says he can’t win at all if the
minimal defensive-strategy is used.

It seems to me that Eppley’s Minimal-Defense was the votes-only criterion
based on SDSC.

…& that SDSC was the original, preference-&-sincerity version.

I preferred preference-&-sincerity because of its universal applicability,
where votes-only had to stipulate a balloting.

On Fri, May 31, 2024 at 12:33 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:

> Why are we having a public discussion about a voting method criterion
> without anyone giving its definition, and with apparently most of the
> participants in the discussion knowing nothing about it besides its name?
>
> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Strategy-free_criterion
>
> The *strategy-free criterion* is a voting system criterion
> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> for evaluating voting
> systems <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system>.
> Definitions
>
> A sincere vote is one with no falsified preferences or preferences left
> unspecified when the election method allows them to be specified (in
> addition to the preferences already specified).
>
> One candidate is preferred over another candidate if, in a one-on-one
> competition, more voters prefer the first candidate than prefer the other
> candidate.
>
> If one candidate is preferred over each of the other candidates, that
> candidate is called "Condorcet candidate" or "Condorcet winner".
> Statement of criterion
>
> If a Condorcet candidate exists, and if a majority prefers this candidate
> to another candidate, then the other candidate should not win if that
> majority votes sincerely and no other voter falsifies any preferences.
>
> In a ranked method, it is nearly equivalent to say:
>
> If more than half of the voters rank *x* above *y*, and there is no
> candidate *z* whom more than half of the voters rank above *x*, then *y* must
> not be elected.
>
>
> I think this evolved into the Minimal Defense criterion, the "votes-only
> version" of which says that if more than half the voters vote A over B and
> B no higher than equal-bottom then B can't win.
>
>
>
> On 31/05/2024 9:46 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> Some time ago, I wrote a criterion that I called Strategy-Free-Criterion
> (SFC).
>
> Is that what you were referring to?
>
> It was about a circumstance in which wv Condorcet is strategy-free. At
> that time, autodeterence hadn’t been considered.
>
> SFC didn’t catch-on, & I haven’t heard mention of it lately, & so I don’t
> know it’s definition. But wv Condorcet is strategy-free in a meaningful
> sense.
>
> On Fri, May 31, 2024 at 05:07 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, May 29, 2024 at 14:15 Closed Limelike Curves <
>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com>
>> Ppwrote:
>>
>>> I'm trying to work out how the strategy-free criterion actually relates
>>> to strategy, because it just sounds like it means the majority-Condorcet
>>> criterion ("if a candidate majority-beats every other, they have to win if
>>> everyone is honest"). @Michael Ossipoff ?
>>>
>>  Closed, isn’t “Strategy-Free Criterion” your new name for FBC.
>>
>> It’s a very inaccurate name. FBC-complying methods aren’t strategy-free
>> in any sense.
>>
>>  But they’re free of any need for *drastic* defensive strategy
>> (favorite-burial or any defensive order-reversal).
>>
>> You want strategy-free? The wv Condorcet methods, such as RP(wv) &
>> MinMax(wv), are strategy-free in a meaningful sense…effectively free of
>> need for any defensive strategy…due to their autodeterence.
>>
>
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