[EM] Did someone not hear what I said about Approval vs Condorcet?

[Michael Ossipoff]

Someone keeps repeating that the voters shouldn’t have to vote
strategically. He wants the method to do it all for us, after we merely
state our sincere-rankings.

…

That’s of course a common attitude:

…

…wanting a high-tech, computation-intensive,  computer-dependent system to
do it all for us, taking all the actual choosing responsibility off of
us.  …sheltering
& isolating us from the choice.

…

I’ve already agreed that a completely legalistic system like a good
Condorcet method is probably the best thing for the inimical electorate in
our public-political elections.

…

...all else being equal (as KM said).

…

I pointed out that all is NOT equal. As desirable as it would be for our
inimical public-political elections, the automatic machine that does it all
for us, to isolate & shelter us from the choosing, comes at too high a
price in our public-political elections.

…

Condorcet for public political elections has a number of problems, with
count-security as the main & most serious problem. I spoke of that before,
but it just didn’t seem to get across.  Hello?

…

Is it that we don’t believe that count-fraud is a genuine problem…or is it
just, so strongly do we want to believe what we believe, that we’ve
convinced ourselves that we didn’t hear?

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Claims that Condorcet is transparent consisted of handwaving that
disregarded the fact that Condorcet requires many, many times more
computation than does Approval.   …& requires many, many times more count
totals be tallied, stored, & transmitted to central-counting.

…

…a humungously, prohibitively, bigger & more computation-intensive count.

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I’ll ask this for the 3rd time:

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How would like you to handount-audit a Condorcet count for a many-candidate
national presidential election?

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As for the belief (if such a belief is what this is about) that count-fraud
isn’t a problem, I’ll repeat this;

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Look up the issues of Harper’s Magazine that came out after each of G.W.
Bushes two elections (2000 & 2004).  Mountains of evidence for widespread
count-fraud. Check out the two Harpers articles.

…

One; thing they mentioned was that a supplier of voting-machines promised
to “deliver” the election to Dubya. One of the two Harper’s articles will
give you details about that.

…

It would be much better to trust the voters to use Approval well, than to
trust all of the count-personnel to not perpetrate  count-fraud in the
elaborate computation-intensive Condorcet count.

…

There might be a desire to have it all done for us by a computer, but that
comes at too high a price.

…

…& that’s not counting Approval’s other advantages, including incomparably
less expensive & easier explanation, definition, proposal, enactment,  &
administration…in addition to the much better count-security that I spoke
of above.

…

How bad, in your perception, is it for voters to have to make the choice
for themselves instead of just telling their preferences & having it done
for us?  The Appoval-opponent I spoke of keeps saying that he wouldn’t know
whether to approve a maybe but maybe-not needed 2nd-choice. A dilemma: Risk
someone worse than him winning, or risk helping him beat your favorite?
That critic complains that that’s unacceptable.

…

Yes, with any method other than the wv Condorcet methods, you don’t know
what your objectively optimal vote is.  Neither do any of the other voters,
so don’t worry about it !!

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That critic seems to believe that it’s necessary to know your
objectively-optimal vote.

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That’s a misbelief.

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As I’ve said, probability & therefore expectation & its maximization depend
of what information you have  & are using.

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No, you can’t know your objectively-optimal vote.

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But you can vote to maximize your expectation, based on the information
that you have & are using.

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I’ve discussed that at length in previous posts, & it probably isn’t
necessary to again post about ways of choosing how to vote in Approval.

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But, just summarize:  It’s easy.  Whichever of the various ways you prefer
to use, for choosing whom to approve, it’s easy.   …& no, it doesn’t
require knowing your objectively-optimal vote.

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Some of us have been so spoiled by what wv Condorcet can achieve, in doing
it all for us, with us only needing to express our sincere
preference-ordering, that we’ve come to believe that that’s necessary.  …having
it all done for us, to shelter & isolate us from the choice.

…

I’ve many times pointed out that Approval’s Myerson-Weber equilibrium is
the voter-median.

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i.e. Approval soon homes in on where the Condorcet-Winner is.

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Have we forgotten that?

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It seems to me that, in every one of EM’s polls, including the recent one,
Approval chose the CW.

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Have we forgotten that?

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The simple, reliable handtool works just fine.

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I should add that I like wv Condorcet (RP(wv) & MinMax(wv) ) for polls,
because of course they look at more information.

…

…& I’d like them for public-political elections too, were it not for the
abovestated  problems of the rank-methods.
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