[EM] 28 years of progress and a wakeup call

[Michael Ossipoff]

I meant that wv Condorcet can be relied on to elect the sincere CW, due to
its excellent deterrence of offensive-strategy.

On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 14:00 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> What Meyerson & Weber demonstrated was that Approval’s Meyerson-Weber
> equilibrium is at the voter-median. i.e. Approval homes in on where the CW
> is.
>
> But, additionally, it seems to me that Approval has chosen the CW on every
> EM poll.
>
> Other than wv Condorcet, Condorcet’s won’t always elect the sincere CW,
> because of strategic-cycles.
>
> My & W also demonstrated that Plurality can keep on electing any pair of
> parties forever at MW-equilibrium.
>
> …which of course is what it’s doing now. (with a bit of help from
> mass-media promotion, & evidently at least occasional count-fraud.
>
> wv Condorcet will, because of how well it deters offensive-strategy.
>
>
>
> On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 13:30 robert bristow-johnson <
> rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> > On 05/21/2024 3:49 PM EDT Closed Limelike Curves <
>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > This list started in 1996. I was born 3 years later, in 1999.
>> >
>> > Six years before I was born, and 3 years before this list was started,
>> Myerson and Weber proved that approval (and score, highest medians, or )
>> will elect the Condorcet winner.
>>
>> I'm sorry.  This "proof" cannot be true.  It is certainly possible *not*
>> to elect the Condorcet winner using either Approval or Score.  This "proof"
>> can be successfully refuted with a counter example.  I posted one a few
>> days ago regarding STAR (but it also says the same about Score and wouldn't
>> be hard to modify to show that for Approval).  A single counter-example is
>> sufficient to disprove that conclusion that Approval and Score will
>> (always) elect the Condorcet winner.
>>
>> > This is true as long as voters use a strategy even a brain-dead turnip
>> could work out: set your approval threshold between the frontrunners.
>>
>> But what are frontrunners?  How do you know who these candidates are
>> under different ballot conditions?  Do you mean FPTP frontrunners?
>>
>> Lastly, I consider it disadvantageous to require any tactical thinking or
>> to incentivize any strategic thinking from voters.  Any more than what
>> Arrow of Gibbard or Satterthwaite say we cannot get away from.  This is why
>> I am for strictly an ordinal ballot, where voters are not required to rank
>> any candidate they don't want to rank, and where possible equal rankings
>> are allowed (this is one reason I have sorta soured regarding BTR-IRV), and
>> the Condorcet winner should always be elected whenever such candidate
>> exists.  I am still not committed about which Condorcet method, but,
>> besides disincentivizing strategic or tactical voting, I am also concerned
>> about the quality and conciseness of the legislative language to describe
>> the method (that was the sole reason I had previously considered BTR-IRV).
>>
>> --
>>
>> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com
>>
>> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>>
>> .
>> .
>> .
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
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