[EM] 28 years of progress and a wakeup call

[Closed Limelike Curves]

Why would Monroe (2001) not apply, unless you use the tied-at-the-top rule?

On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 2:09 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> I meant that wv Condorcet can be relied on to elect the sincere CW, due to
> its excellent deterrence of offensive-strategy.
>
> On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 14:00 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> What Meyerson & Weber demonstrated was that Approval’s Meyerson-Weber
>> equilibrium is at the voter-median. i.e. Approval homes in on where the CW
>> is.
>>
>> But, additionally, it seems to me that Approval has chosen the CW on
>> every EM poll.
>>
>> Other than wv Condorcet, Condorcet’s won’t always elect the sincere CW,
>> because of strategic-cycles.
>>
>> My & W also demonstrated that Plurality can keep on electing any pair of
>> parties forever at MW-equilibrium.
>>
>> …which of course is what it’s doing now. (with a bit of help from
>> mass-media promotion, & evidently at least occasional count-fraud.
>>
>> wv Condorcet will, because of how well it deters offensive-strategy.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 13:30 robert bristow-johnson <
>> rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> > On 05/21/2024 3:49 PM EDT Closed Limelike Curves <
>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > This list started in 1996. I was born 3 years later, in 1999.
>>> >
>>> > Six years before I was born, and 3 years before this list was started,
>>> Myerson and Weber proved that approval (and score, highest medians, or )
>>> will elect the Condorcet winner.
>>>
>>> I'm sorry.  This "proof" cannot be true.  It is certainly possible *not*
>>> to elect the Condorcet winner using either Approval or Score.  This "proof"
>>> can be successfully refuted with a counter example.  I posted one a few
>>> days ago regarding STAR (but it also says the same about Score and wouldn't
>>> be hard to modify to show that for Approval).  A single counter-example is
>>> sufficient to disprove that conclusion that Approval and Score will
>>> (always) elect the Condorcet winner.
>>>
>>> > This is true as long as voters use a strategy even a brain-dead turnip
>>> could work out: set your approval threshold between the frontrunners.
>>>
>>> But what are frontrunners?  How do you know who these candidates are
>>> under different ballot conditions?  Do you mean FPTP frontrunners?
>>>
>>> Lastly, I consider it disadvantageous to require any tactical thinking
>>> or to incentivize any strategic thinking from voters.  Any more than what
>>> Arrow of Gibbard or Satterthwaite say we cannot get away from.  This is why
>>> I am for strictly an ordinal ballot, where voters are not required to rank
>>> any candidate they don't want to rank, and where possible equal rankings
>>> are allowed (this is one reason I have sorta soured regarding BTR-IRV), and
>>> the Condorcet winner should always be elected whenever such candidate
>>> exists.  I am still not committed about which Condorcet method, but,
>>> besides disincentivizing strategic or tactical voting, I am also concerned
>>> about the quality and conciseness of the legislative language to describe
>>> the method (that was the sole reason I had previously considered BTR-IRV).
>>>
>>> --
>>>
>>> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com
>>>
>>> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>>>
>>> .
>>> .
>>> .
>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>> info
>>>
>>
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