[EM] Approval vs Condorcet. Voting in Approval.

[Michael Ossipoff]

I hope it’s okay to post, as a separate thread, some comments that I made
in a discussion-reply.  …so that the comments will get noticed more, by
having their own thread-title.

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I’d intended this as “electioneering”, but now I’m a bit late for that.

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Yes, many want the method to do everything for us. In fact I agree with RBJ
that, for an inimical electorate (like our public political elections), the
completely legalistic pairwise-count rank-methods (Condorcet) would be
best…all else being equal, as you said.

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But all else is *not* equal !

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Count-fraud is a problem. Condorcet’s humungously computation-intensive
count ridiculously facilitates count-fraud.

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You want to do a handcount-audit of a Condorcet count?

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Additionally, the count-program itself is easier to hide or add fraud-code
in.

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As a general principle, then yes it’s much better to have the voters do it
for themselves rather than having a complicated fraud-prone
automatic-machine do everything for them.

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A simple, reliable hand-tool is much better.

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I’d much rather trust the voters to use the simple reliable hand-tool
(Approval) well, than trust everyone responsible for the count to not
perpetrate count-fraud.

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I’m glad you brought up the desire for the method to do it all for us (as
Condorcet does)…taking our sincere rankings as input, & outputting the
legalistic right choice. …because I’ve been meaning to address that matter.

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…& that’s not even counting the much less expensive implementation (could
be zero cost, without even needing new count-software), easier less
expensive administration, & easier simpler explanation with consequent
easier enactment.

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Approval isn’t as difficult to vote as it opponents claim.  There are many
ways to choose what or whom to approve. That variety is a good thing,
because you can choose how you like.

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Condorcet is legalistic, but we don’t have to be legalistic! Approval
guarantees election of the candidate who maximizes the number of voters for
whom the outcome is in their preferred of the two merit-subsets, however
the voter designates them.

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e.g. If people approve what they like, Approval maximizes the number of
people who like the outcome.

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If people approve what’s acceptable, then Approval maximizes the number of
people for whom the outcome is acceptable.

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If people approve above expectation, then Approval maximizes the number of
people for whom the outcome is above expectation…maximizes the number of
people pleasantly surprised.

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You don’t know the objectively-optimal vote? Neither does anyone else, so
don’t worry about it!

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Probability, & therefore expectation & it’s optimization, depends on your
available information.

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Approving above your subjective perception of expectation genuinely
maximizes your expectation.

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Ways of maximizing your expectation:

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Approve everyone you’d appoint instead of holding the election. Or approve
everyone whose election wouldn’t disappoint you.

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The polling CW is a good estimate of election-expectation. Approve hir &
everyone better.

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If you perceive 2 likely frontrunners, approve the better one & everyone
better. (…but don’t believe the bullshit that the Democrat & the Republican
are the 2 choices).

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If all were acceptable, then I’d just approve whom I like. If it were a
public-political election, I might try Better-Than-Expectation before that.
…otherwise, after. If I like them all, & there aren’t the appearances that
inform about expectation, then I’d approve above mean, if I perceived the
mean. But do we perceive the mean? If not, maybe I’d approve the best half
of them (Above-Median), or above the biggest merit-gap.

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Above in this post, I described some 0-info strategies, & ways of judging
where the election’s expectation is.

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Summary:

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Approve all the Acceptables & no Unacceptables

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Or, if all are acceptable, approve the ones you like. Of course that
maximizes the probability of electing someone you like

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If you like them all, approve above expectation. (If it’s a
public-election, maybe try expectation before “Liked”.)

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…with expectation judged by whom you’d appoint instead of holding the
election, or by whose election wouldn’t disappoint you. …or by taking the
polls’  CW as the expectation. Best-Frontrunner-&-Better can be regarded as
one of the ways of judging expectation & approving by it.

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If there aren’t the appearances needed for judging expectation, then use
one of the remaining 0-info methods, such as:

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Above-Mean
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