[EM] POLL: References (was Re: Poll, preliminary ballots)
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_elmet at t-online.de
Tue May 14 11:36:10 PDT 2024
On 2024-05-14 19:55, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> It seems to me that the Weak Defensive Strategy Criterion was a
> generalization of FBC:
>
> One should never get a worse result because they didn’t vote something
> they like less over something they like more.
>
> Strictly-speaking, Condorcet methods fail, but wv Condorcet doesn’t fail
> importantly. Most other Condorcet methods fail badly, because they fail
> FBC badly.
>
> I don’t expect Benham to either, though wv is all that I’ve tested.
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Weak_Defensive_Strategy_criterion says that
Schulze passes.
So does
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2000-April/102004.html.
It also seems to define the criterion a bit differently:
>> If a majority prefers one particular candidate to another, then they
>> should have a way of voting that will ensure that the other cannot win,
>> without any member of that majority reversing a preference for one
>> candidate over another.
which would indicate that the majority can bar a particular candidate
from winning by voting in some given way that does not involve order
reversal, only truncation.
If there's a sincere CW, then it's the same as your criterion, but if
not, then there may be one majority who prefers A to B and another that
prefers A to C, but no majority preferring A to both B and C. Then the
majority preferring A to B should have a way to stop B from winning...
I think? It's not my criterion.
-km
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