[EM] POLL: References (was Re: Poll, preliminary ballots)

Closed Limelike Curves closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com
Tue May 14 11:47:27 PDT 2024


>
> which would indicate that the majority can bar a particular candidate
> from winning by voting in some given way that does not involve order
> reversal, only truncation.
>
Only exaggeration, more precisely—basically, you can elect the Condorcet
winner by voting approval-style and bunching up the candidates at the top
and bottom. (Possibly with some intermediate ranks for "unsure").

On Tue, May 14, 2024 at 11:36 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
km_elmet at t-online.de> wrote:

> On 2024-05-14 19:55, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> > It seems to me that the Weak Defensive Strategy Criterion was a
> > generalization of FBC:
> >
> > One should never get a worse result because they didn’t vote something
> > they like less over something they like more.
> >
> > Strictly-speaking, Condorcet methods fail, but wv Condorcet doesn’t fail
> > importantly. Most other Condorcet methods fail badly, because they fail
> > FBC badly.
> >
> > I don’t expect Benham to either, though wv is all that I’ve tested.
>
> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Weak_Defensive_Strategy_criterion says that
> Schulze passes.
>
> So does
>
> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2000-April/102004.html
> .
>
> It also seems to define the criterion a bit differently:
>
> >> If a majority prefers one particular candidate to another, then they
> >> should have a way of voting that will ensure that the other cannot win,
> >> without any member of that majority reversing a preference for one
> >> candidate over another.
>
> which would indicate that the majority can bar a particular candidate
> from winning by voting in some given way that does not involve order
> reversal, only truncation.
>
> If there's a sincere CW, then it's the same as your criterion, but if
> not, then there may be one majority who prefers A to B and another that
> prefers A to C, but no majority preferring A to both B and C. Then the
> majority preferring A to B should have a way to stop B from winning...
>
> I think? It's not my criterion.
>
> -km
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> info
>
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