[EM] wv Condorcet vs CW,Plurality

[Michael Ossipoff]

Additionally, wv Condorcet meets Minimal-Defense.

I completely agree with wanting simplicity, for various reasons. But not
when it loses the difference between Condorcet from IRV & Plurality.

If you want simplicity improvement from Condorcet (as do I), then you’re
better off with Approval, which meets FBC.

wv Condorcet theoretically, but not practically, fails FBC. Plurality, IRV
& CW,Plurality blatantly & fully-problematically fail FBC.

On Mon, May 13, 2024 at 13:14 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> I can’t find the thread 🧵conversation  that I want to reply to, so it’s
> necessary to post my answer as a new thread, even though it’s just a reply:
>
> It was about Condorcet-Plurality, which I call “ CW,Plurality”.
>
> With wv Condorcet,  burial’s ratio of backfires to successes is 10.  b/s =
> 10.
>
> For CW,Plurality, b/s = 1.
>
> Given that would-be buriers will sometimes feel that there’s a good chance
> of their candidate being Plurality-winner, then there’s incentive for
> burial, & it will probably succeed.
>
> When burial isn’t deterred, as it isn’t in CW,Plurality, that burial might
> well defeat the CW& elect an unacceptable candidate.
>
> If avoiding the election of an Unacceptable is paramount, then it’s
> necessary to maximally protect the Acceptables.
>
> In CW,Plurality—as in IRV—that would consist of trying to prevent burial
> from successfully making a strategic cycle.
>
> So, equal-toprank  all of the Acceptables, so that you aren’t helping the
> buriers make anyone beat any Acceptable.
>
> But you can’t count on the other Acceptable-preferrers doing that. So you
> must take it farther than that. You must try to rank the Acceptables in
> order of their probability of being the CW that you need to, & can, protect
> from defeat by burial.
>
> You have to guess about the other Acceptable-preferrers: What candidates,
> in what order, are most likely to be the one whom you must & can protect
> from burial… to maximize the probability of electing an Acceptable instead
> of an Unacceptable.
>
> That’s just like IRV.  …which is just like Plurality.
>
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