[EM] wv Condorcet vs CW,Plurality

[Michael Ossipoff]

I can’t find the thread 🧵conversation  that I want to reply to, so it’s
necessary to post my answer as a new thread, even though it’s just a reply:

It was about Condorcet-Plurality, which I call “ CW,Plurality”.

With wv Condorcet,  burial’s ratio of backfires to successes is 10.  b/s =
10.

For CW,Plurality, b/s = 1.

Given that would-be buriers will sometimes feel that there’s a good chance
of their candidate being Plurality-winner, then there’s incentive for
burial, & it will probably succeed.

When burial isn’t deterred, as it isn’t in CW,Plurality, that burial might
well defeat the CW& elect an unacceptable candidate.

If avoiding the election of an Unacceptable is paramount, then it’s
necessary to maximally protect the Acceptables.

In CW,Plurality—as in IRV—that would consist of trying to prevent burial
from successfully making a strategic cycle.

So, equal-toprank  all of the Acceptables, so that you aren’t helping the
buriers make anyone beat any Acceptable.

But you can’t count on the other Acceptable-preferrers doing that. So you
must take it farther than that. You must try to rank the Acceptables in
order of their probability of being the CW that you need to, & can, protect
from defeat by burial.

You have to guess about the other Acceptable-preferrers: What candidates,
in what order, are most likely to be the one whom you must & can protect
from burial… to maximize the probability of electing an Acceptable instead
of an Unacceptable.

That’s just like IRV.  …which is just like Plurality.
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