[EM] wv Condorcet vs CW,Plurality

[Michael Ossipoff]

…&, I forgot to mention, Approval doesn’t have Condorcet’s facilitation of
count-fraud, due to humungously computation-intensive count.

Hand-count audit in Condorcet? Forgot it.

On Mon, May 13, 2024 at 13:40 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Additionally, wv Condorcet meets Minimal-Defense.
>
> I completely agree with wanting simplicity, for various reasons. But not
> when it loses the difference between Condorcet from IRV & Plurality.
>
> If you want simplicity improvement from Condorcet (as do I), then you’re
> better off with Approval, which meets FBC.
>
> wv Condorcet theoretically, but not practically, fails FBC. Plurality, IRV
> & CW,Plurality blatantly & fully-problematically fail FBC.
>
> On Mon, May 13, 2024 at 13:14 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> I can’t find the thread 🧵conversation  that I want to reply to, so it’s
>> necessary to post my answer as a new thread, even though it’s just a reply:
>>
>> It was about Condorcet-Plurality, which I call “ CW,Plurality”.
>>
>> With wv Condorcet,  burial’s ratio of backfires to successes is 10.  b/s
>> = 10.
>>
>> For CW,Plurality, b/s = 1.
>>
>> Given that would-be buriers will sometimes feel that there’s a good
>> chance of their candidate being Plurality-winner, then there’s incentive
>> for burial, & it will probably succeed.
>>
>> When burial isn’t deterred, as it isn’t in CW,Plurality, that burial
>> might well defeat the CW& elect an unacceptable candidate.
>>
>> If avoiding the election of an Unacceptable is paramount, then it’s
>> necessary to maximally protect the Acceptables.
>>
>> In CW,Plurality—as in IRV—that would consist of trying to prevent burial
>> from successfully making a strategic cycle.
>>
>> So, equal-toprank  all of the Acceptables, so that you aren’t helping the
>> buriers make anyone beat any Acceptable.
>>
>> But you can’t count on the other Acceptable-preferrers doing that. So you
>> must take it farther than that. You must try to rank the Acceptables in
>> order of their probability of being the CW that you need to, & can, protect
>> from defeat by burial.
>>
>> You have to guess about the other Acceptable-preferrers: What candidates,
>> in what order, are most likely to be the one whom you must & can protect
>> from burial… to maximize the probability of electing an Acceptable instead
>> of an Unacceptable.
>>
>> That’s just like IRV.  …which is just like Plurality.
>>
>
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