[EM] Hare

[Closed Limelike Curves]

>
> I’ve told how wv Condorcet deters offensive-strategy.  …without which
> there’s no “incentive” ( need) for favorite-burial, or any
> defensive-strategy.
>
There's still an incentive for favorite betrayal
<https://www.rangevoting.org/VenzSimp.html>.

Relative majority Condorcet is incompatible with both FBC and later-no-help.

On Sun, May 12, 2024 at 8:47 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
>
> On Sun, May 12, 2024 at 20:23 Closed Limelike Curves
> <closed.limelike.curves wrote:
>
> [quote]
> But allowing any *plurality-strength* Condorcet candidate to win creates
> screwy burial and favorite-betrayal incentives that can end up with a
> unanimous favorite/least favorite winning.
> [quote]
>
> I’ve told how wv Condorcet deters offensive-strategy.  …without which
> there’s no “incentive” ( need) for favorite-burial, or any
> defensive-strategy.
>
> Alright, that’s enough from Closed. Enough assertions from someone who
> needs instead to listen & ask.
>
> I’m blocking Closed, so that I won’t have receive copies of his blather.
>
> As I usually mention at this point, when I don’t answer Closed, that
> doesn’t mean he’s said something irrefutable. It’s just that I’ve rerouted
> his messages so Trash.
>
>>
>> On Sat, May 11, 2024 at 9:49 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, May 11, 2024 at 20:08 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I'm sorry Mike, but I find this to be an absurd inversion of the truth.
>>>
>>>
>>> What do you have against pizza & movies?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Hare's  LNHarm,
>>>
>>>
>>> FairVote makes much of that because it’s IRV’s claim-to-game. Its
>>> strong-suit.
>>>
>>> LNHa gives you the freedom to express preference among even your
>>> bottom-most choices. … to vote nearly-worst over even-worse.
>>>
>>> You pay for your bottom-end freedom with abysmal top-end favorite-burial
>>> need.
>>>
>>>
>>> LNHelp
>>>
>>>
>>> Is that a problem with Condorcet? It hasn’t worried me, & I haven’t
>>> heard about it as a problem.
>>>
>>>>
>>> Clone Independence,
>>>
>>>
>>> Of course RP & Schulz are clone-independent.
>>>
>>>>
>>> a quite weak Compromise
>>>> incentive
>>>
>>>
>>> In what part of the Twilight-Zone?
>>>
>>> IRV has horrendous favorite-burial need.
>>>
>>> Just for this discussion, let’s simplify by pretending that the
>>> Democrats are acceptable.
>>>
>>> Say it’s Trump, Biden & Jill Stein.
>>>
>>> Say you like Stein best.
>>>
>>> But say that a lot of Biden-preferrers like her least & are expected to
>>> rank Trump 2nd because their sources have so much bad to say about Stein.
>>>
>>> But say Stein has a strong following, & her preferrers, including  you,
>>> are numerous enough to make her eliminate Biden.
>>>
>>> Maybe Stein can beat Trump, & maybe not (because this is a story).
>>>
>>> Do you toprank Stein, to eliminate Joe, so that his voters will transfer
>>> to Trump, electing Trump?
>>>
>>> If you know what you’re doing, you bury your favorite under Joe.
>>>
>>> Will that situation happen all the time? No.
>>>
>>> But if preventing the election of an unacceptable is paramount, so that
>>> you don’t want to take any chance when it’s uncertain, then you must bury
>>> your favorite under the compromise, even if you dislike the compromise.
>>>
>>> But wait—it gets even better:
>>>
>>>
>>> Say it isn’t certain which Acceptable will be the one that you can help
>>> to avoid elimination.
>>>
>>> You have to guess. You have to try your best to rank the Acceptables in
>>> order of winnability… starting with the one most likely to get enough
>>> 2st-choice support from the other Acceptables-preferrers to escape
>>> elimination.
>>>
>>> You have to make that guess about the other Acceptables-preferrers…the
>>> order in which the Acceptables will be supported by them, thereby making
>>> them prospects for escaping elimination.
>>>
>>> Sound familiar? That’s right: It’s just the same as Plurality.
>>>
>>> Just a more expensive Plurality election.
>>>
>>> wv Condorcet has zero “compromise incentive”.
>>>
>>> Yes, other Condorcet versions have that problem, due to their
>>> burial-vulnerability. …resulting in a problem resembling IRV.
>>>
>>> But, with wv Condorcet, burial is well-deterred, because it’s 10 times
>>> more likely to backfire than to succeed.
>>>
>>>  Offensive-strategy is the only problem with Condorcet. FairVote makes
>>> much of that, claiming that all Condorcet has that problem.
>>>
>>> Forgive me for disappointing you, but wv * doesn’t* have that or any
>>> strategy problem.
>>>
>>> I prefer Hare to Condorcet for pizza-topping, ice-cream flavor or
>>> movie-choice, because of the 2 Hare advantages that I stated.
>>>
>>> The choice between Condorcet & Hare for public political elections is:
>>>
>>> Do you want complete freedom from strategy-need, or do you want
>>> abominable favorite- burial need?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> and invulnerability to any other strategy except difficult-
>>>> to-coordinate (and somewhat risky) Push-over are all things of use in a
>>>> tough competitive election (with plenty of mutual enmity).
>>>>
>>>> What's useful or attractive about any of those properties in a friendly
>>>> election about pizza toppings or movies?  For that some Condorcet
>>>> method
>>>> or Score or even Borda should be fine.
>>>>
>>>> Chris B.
>>>>
>>>> On 12/05/2024 5:58 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>> > When there are no unacceptable alternatives, no greater-evil, & no
>>>> > enmity, then Hare would be fine.
>>>> >
>>>> > .. with the advantages of no unfavorite compromise & an easy
>>>> handcount.
>>>> >
>>>> > Great for pizza 🍕 toppings or movies 🍿.
>>>> >
>>>> > …but not for public political elections.
>>>> >
>>>> > ----
>>>> > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>> list info
>>>>
>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>> info
>>>
>>
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