[EM] Finding Condorcet

[Closed Limelike Curves]

Even without the cycles or compromise—the really big mistake in the paper
is treating the elections as though the candidates on the ballot are the
actual choices society faces. In reality, there's plenty of others, but not
one of them runs.

If you have only 1 or 2 choices, every method gives the same result. But if
IRV actually *was* good at electing Condorcet winners, there would be more
than 1 or 2 options.

On Tue, Mar 26, 2024 at 4:39 PM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
wrote:

> On 2024-03-26 21:32, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
> > New paper.  (He quotes me early in the paper.  That kinda tickled me. :-)
> >
> > https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4763372
> >
> > I'm in contact with the author.
> >
> > Just thought some of you might want to be aware of it.
>
> Congrats :-)
>
> As for Condorcet winners: if politics is 1D and there's not too much
> noise, there will be a sincere CW. If opinion space grows, say by more
> parties being established, then you could get sincere cycles, but not
> necessarily. So the lack of cycles shouldn't be too surprising... I
> guess if anything, it's most surprising in Australia, because the Senate
> has multiple parties. But from its House of Reps composition, it might
> just be that IRV's compromise incentive is too strong.
>
> -km
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>
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