[EM] Characterization of some voting-systems & their results

[Michael Garman]

Perhaps…but this assumes that everyone values the same candidates the same.
The polls that show that near-majorities of Americans want a third party
are often taken out of context by people who don’t take into account that
everyone wants a different third party — I want a socialist party, some
people want a centrist party, others want a libertarian party, still others
want a full-fledged Nazi party, etc etc. If most people approve one third
party candidate and one “lesser evil,” we get lesser evil again.

Which is fine by me if that’s truly who the voters want, but it seems like
a stretch to me to say that approval solves the lesser-evil problem.
On Sun, Mar 24, 2024 at 2:42 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Sorry, one more comment, in answer to a frequent criticism:
>
> In Approval:
>
> If some or many people approve an unfavorite lesser-evil “compromise”
> (many are going to make the mistake of voting for one in November), then
> pretty much everyone who approves him also approves better candidates too.
>
> But those better candidates will also be approved by people, including me,
> who would never approve that evil.
>
> …& so a better candidate wins & the evil loses.
>
>
> On Sat, Mar 23, 2024 at 18:30 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Addendum:
>>
>> In the Approval-result, I should have added that there’s no
>> sincere-vs-strategic issue.
>>
>> On Sat, Mar 23, 2024 at 18:27 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Approval maximizes the number of people pleasantly-surprised, &/or the
>>> number who get something they like.
>>>
>>> Condorcet:
>>>
>>> “This complicated automatic-machine will legalistically tell us who has
>>> the right to get their way.”
>>>
>>> Score:
>>>
>>> Robert is right, that people can’t be expected to rate sincerely
>>> (merit-proportionate) in Score when something is at-stake.
>>>
>>> But in polls where nothing material is at-stake, & when people would
>>> rather find out how liked their favorite is—instead of falsifying to make
>>> people believe that their favorite is most-liked—then people will rate
>>> merit-proportionate, & score will meaningfully measure overall merit.
>>>
>> ----
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