[EM] Characterization of some voting-systems & their results

[Michael Ossipoff]

Addendum:

In the Approval-result, I should have added that there’s no
sincere-vs-strategic issue.

On Sat, Mar 23, 2024 at 18:27 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Approval maximizes the number of people pleasantly-surprised, &/or the
> number who get something they like.
>
> Condorcet:
>
> “This complicated automatic-machine will legalistically tell us who has
> the right to get their way.”
>
> Score:
>
> Robert is right, that people can’t be expected to rate sincerely
> (merit-proportionate) in Score when something is at-stake.
>
> But in polls where nothing material is at-stake, & when people would
> rather find out how liked their favorite is—instead of falsifying to make
> people believe that their favorite is most-liked—then people will rate
> merit-proportionate, & score will meaningfully measure overall merit.
>
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