[EM] Part 2, Approval vs Condorcet

[Michael Ossipoff]

Some pragmatics:

What would happen this November if we were using Approval?

There are lesser-evil hold-your-nose voters who are going to vote for Biden
though they don’t like him, because they think they have to accept
lesser-evil because (I guess?) they’ve been told that everyone else wants
evil
:-)

Those people would probably approve Biden, whether they really approve of
him or not.

But they’d also approve Jill Stein, because they prefer her (though they
now, with Plurality, mistakenly believe it unrealistic to vote for her).

Polls show something like 70% of Americans don’t want the Democrats or
Republicans, & want different parties.

Polls show that the same % want a lot of policies that are the opposite of
what the Republocratic party are imposing on them.

The policies that they say they want are the ones that the Greens offer. No
I’m not electioneering. It isn’t possible to discuss voting without
sometimes saying something like that. It’s necessary to speak of
pragmatics, & that requires specifics.

My reason for saying that is to support my claim that those people who now
are going to vote for Biden as lesser-evil, would, in Approval, also
approve Jill Stein.

Just about everyone who approves Joe would approve Jill.

But many (including me) who approve Jill would never consider approving Joe
!!!

Therefore Jill would beat Joe & Donald.
——-
Approval’s Myerson-Weber equilibrium is at the voter-median. …& so Approval
quickly homes in on the CW.

A Myerson-Weber equilibrium is an outcome that is consistent with, &
therefore appears to confirm, the assumptions that led to that outcome.

——-

Advantages of Approval over ranks-methods:

Approval is the absolutely minimal voting-system that allows & counts free
expression of acceptance or merit, & comparisons of it, among several or
many candidates in a multicandidate election.

…& is therefore the unique completely unarbitrary method.

With any other method, people will ask, “But why *this* method among all
the many others?”

Approval isn’t subject to that question, because there’s only one
absolutely minimal method.

Approval is uniquely easy to define, explain, propose, enact, administer, &
security-audit against count-fraud.

Those are a lot of big, & absolutely-necessary, advantages.

Let’s start with count-fraud:

If there are 20 candidates, Approval has 20 vote-totals to sum, keep track
of, audit & send to Central-Count

Condorcet has 380 pairwise votes to calculate, sum, keep track of, audit &
send to Central-Count.

About 20 times more vote-totals.

Additionally, in Approval, it’s only necessary to increment a number when
encountering a vote.

…while, in Condorcet, each pairwise vote must first be found by running a
subroutine on a ranking.

So, overall, how many times more computation does Condorcet need?

A hundred times more? Several hundred times more?

How about a handcount audit?

For Condorcet ?  :-D

Now chance.

A spot-check?

It would have to be a much tinier spot, sample.

Did you know that, after both of Dubya’s elections, Harper’s Magazine
reported mountains of evidence for big count-fraud?

Don’t ignore or discount count-fraud. Minimizing the chance of successful
count-fraud is absolutely-essential.

This concludes p
Part 2.

Part 3 (of 3) will be along next.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20240321/6ec2ca39/attachment.htm>