[EM] No. Condorcet and Hare do not share the same problem with computational complexity and process transparency.

[robert bristow-johnson]

> On 03/20/2024 4:16 PM EDT Michael Garman <michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
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> Precinct summability isn't the be-all or end-all of "security," either.

It's not sufficient.  But it's necessary.

And you're deliberately avoiding the issue of the **source** of data that we use for an audit.

With IRV, the source of data is the same as what the government being audited supplies us **after** it's been compiled by the same government being audited.

At the polling place, there is one and only one leg of the data path that is opaque and that is with the ballot tabulator itself.  So, even with Precinct Summability, it's conceivable that the tabulator has been hacked.  But that risk is there anyway, even with FPTP.

But **if** the tabulators are not hacked, and summable tallies are published at every polling place, then it is impossible for any nefarious actor to fudge the results afterward.  That's the point that you're in denial about.

--

r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

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