[EM] No. Condorcet and Hare do not share the same problem with computational complexity and process transparency.

Michael Garman michael.garman at rankthevote.us
Wed Mar 20 13:26:01 PDT 2024


Who's the conspiracy theorist now?

On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 9:25 PM robert bristow-johnson <
rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:

>
>
> > On 03/20/2024 4:16 PM EDT Michael Garman <michael.garman at rankthevote.us>
> wrote:
> >
> >
> > Precinct summability isn't the be-all or end-all of "security," either.
>
> It's not sufficient.  But it's necessary.
>
> And you're deliberately avoiding the issue of the **source** of data that
> we use for an audit.
>
> With IRV, the source of data is the same as what the government being
> audited supplies us **after** it's been compiled by the same government
> being audited.
>
> At the polling place, there is one and only one leg of the data path that
> is opaque and that is with the ballot tabulator itself.  So, even with
> Precinct Summability, it's conceivable that the tabulator has been hacked.
> But that risk is there anyway, even with FPTP.
>
> But **if** the tabulators are not hacked, and summable tallies are
> published at every polling place, then it is impossible for any nefarious
> actor to fudge the results afterward.  That's the point that you're in
> denial about.
>
> --
>
> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
> .
> .
> .
>
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