[EM] Fwd: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 236, Issue 18

[Michael Ossipoff]

When I wrote “Mutual-Defense” I meant “Minimal-Defense”.

On Sat, Mar 16, 2024 at 20:49 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
>
> On Sat, Mar 16, 2024 at 18:12 Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>> Every method does this. With 3 candidates all Condorcet methods can
>> encourage burial.
>>
>
> No, the best Condorcet methods strongly deter burial, in two separate ways:
>
> 1.  They meet Mutual-Defense
> 2. Additionally, they’re strongly autodeterent.
>
>>
>> BTW, I posted at r/EndFPTP a derived scenario that shows how STAR fails
>>> to disincentivize tactical voting, even with the head-to-head runoff.
>>> https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/1bbq6hu/heres_a_good_hypothetical_for_how_star_fails/
>>
>> I don't see how that's a failure. There's two possibilities here:
>> 1. If the votes are honest, I don't see what the problem is. The three
>> candidates are neck-and-neck and there's not much reason to prefer any.
>> 2. If the votes are strategic, this seems like terrible strategy on the
>> part of each group. Why wouldn't you give the center candidate more than 0
>> stars?
>>
>> On Sat, Mar 16, 2024 at 11:52 AM robert bristow-johnson <
>> rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> >
>>> > On Thu, Mar 14, 2024 at 6:14 PM Michael Ossipoff <
>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>> > > Reply continued:
>>> > >
>>> > > Anyone who votes other than all-or-nothing in a public political
>>> election is using poor strategy.
>>> > >
>>>
>>> But requiring voters to use **any** strategy at all is IMO just
>>> undesirable.  Incentivizing strategic or tactical voting is a burden, not a
>>> desirable quality of a voting system.  This is why I think **any** Cardinal
>>> system is flawed for competitive partisan voting in elections for public
>>> office.
>>>
>>> > On 03/16/2024 2:27 PM EDT Closed Limelike Curves <
>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>> >
>>> > And if voters want to do their part to elect the best candidate,
>>> instead of playing strategic games, we should let them! We want honest
>>> voting to be as easy as possible, because honest voting is a public good.
>>> Filling in a bubble labeled 5/5 is no harder than filling one labeled 1/1.
>>> But in real life I don't carry dice around very often.
>>>
>>> I'm really with Limelike here.  Except I think filling in a Score bubble
>>> *does* require more thought than ranking even if the voter ends up bullet
>>> voting.
>>>
>>> BTW, I posted at r/EndFPTP a derived scenario that shows how STAR fails
>>> to disincentivize tactical voting, even with the head-to-head runoff.
>>> https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/1bbq6hu/heres_a_good_hypothetical_for_how_star_fails/
>>>
>>> We don't wanna burden voters with any pressure to vote tactically, do
>>> we?  Why are people (equal.vote, CES) promoting methods that, whenever
>>> there are 3 or more candidates, **inherently** forces voters to make
>>> tactical consideration of how they're going to vote for their 2nd-favorite
>>> candidate?
>>>
>>> RCV can screw up.  And because of Condorcet cycles, even Condorcet RCV
>>> will have those very few elections where it cannot prevent a spoiled
>>> election (and the bad things that come along with spoiled election) because
>>> of a cycle.  But, if we're gonna evaluate all of our votes equally, the
>>> ranked ballot asks exactly the right questions whereas the Score ballot
>>> requires more information from voters than should be demanded of them (or
>>> the Approval ballot requires too little information, but there is *still*
>>> tactical considerations required).  But with RCV, we **know** what to do
>>> with our 2nd-favorite candidate: rank them #2.
>>>
>>> --
>>>
>>> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com
>>>
>>> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>>>
>>> .
>>> .
>>> .
>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>> info
>>>
>> ----
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>> info
>>
>
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