<div dir="auto">When I wrote “Mutual-Defense” I meant “Minimal-Defense”.</div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sat, Mar 16, 2024 at 20:49 Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com">email9648742@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div><br></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sat, Mar 16, 2024 at 18:12 Closed Limelike Curves <<a href="mailto:closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com" target="_blank">closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)" dir="auto"><br></blockquote><div>Every method does this. With 3 candidates all Condorcet methods can encourage burial.</div></div></div></div></blockquote><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">No, the best Condorcet methods strongly deter burial, in two separate ways:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">1. They meet Mutual-Defense </div><div dir="auto">2. Additionally, they’re strongly autodeterent.</div></div></div><div><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="auto"></div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">BTW, I posted at r/EndFPTP a derived scenario that shows how STAR fails to disincentivize tactical voting, even with the head-to-head runoff. <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/1bbq6hu/heres_a_good_hypothetical_for_how_star_fails/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/1bbq6hu/heres_a_good_hypothetical_for_how_star_fails/</a></blockquote><div>I don't see how that's a failure. There's two possibilities here:</div><div>1. If the votes are honest, I don't see what the problem is. The three candidates are neck-and-neck and there's not much reason to prefer any.</div><div>2. If the votes are strategic, this seems like terrible strategy on the part of each group. Why wouldn't you give the center candidate more than 0 stars?</div></div></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sat, Mar 16, 2024 at 11:52 AM robert bristow-johnson <<a href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com" target="_blank">rbj@audioimagination.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><br>
> <br>
> On Thu, Mar 14, 2024 at 6:14 PM Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
> > Reply continued:<br>
> > <br>
> > Anyone who votes other than all-or-nothing in a public political election is using poor strategy.<br>
> > <br>
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But requiring voters to use **any** strategy at all is IMO just undesirable. Incentivizing strategic or tactical voting is a burden, not a desirable quality of a voting system. This is why I think **any** Cardinal system is flawed for competitive partisan voting in elections for public office.<br>
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> On 03/16/2024 2:27 PM EDT Closed Limelike Curves <<a href="mailto:closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com" target="_blank">closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
> <br>
> And if voters want to do their part to elect the best candidate, instead of playing strategic games, we should let them! We want honest voting to be as easy as possible, because honest voting is a public good. Filling in a bubble labeled 5/5 is no harder than filling one labeled 1/1. But in real life I don't carry dice around very often.<br>
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I'm really with Limelike here. Except I think filling in a Score bubble *does* require more thought than ranking even if the voter ends up bullet voting.<br>
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BTW, I posted at r/EndFPTP a derived scenario that shows how STAR fails to disincentivize tactical voting, even with the head-to-head runoff. <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/1bbq6hu/heres_a_good_hypothetical_for_how_star_fails/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/1bbq6hu/heres_a_good_hypothetical_for_how_star_fails/</a> <br>
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We don't wanna burden voters with any pressure to vote tactically, do we? Why are people (<a href="http://equal.vote" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">equal.vote</a>, CES) promoting methods that, whenever there are 3 or more candidates, **inherently** forces voters to make tactical consideration of how they're going to vote for their 2nd-favorite candidate?<br>
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RCV can screw up. And because of Condorcet cycles, even Condorcet RCV will have those very few elections where it cannot prevent a spoiled election (and the bad things that come along with spoiled election) because of a cycle. But, if we're gonna evaluate all of our votes equally, the ranked ballot asks exactly the right questions whereas the Score ballot requires more information from voters than should be demanded of them (or the Approval ballot requires too little information, but there is *still* tactical considerations required). But with RCV, we **know** what to do with our 2nd-favorite candidate: rank them #2.<br>
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r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ <a href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com" target="_blank">rbj@audioimagination.com</a><br>
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"Imagination is more important than knowledge."<br>
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