[EM] Fwd: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 236, Issue 18

[Michael Ossipoff]

On Sat, Mar 16, 2024 at 18:12 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:

>
>> Every method does this. With 3 candidates all Condorcet methods can
> encourage burial.
>

No, the best Condorcet methods strongly deter burial, in two separate ways:

1.  They meet Mutual-Defense
2. Additionally, they’re strongly autodeterent.

>
> BTW, I posted at r/EndFPTP a derived scenario that shows how STAR fails to
>> disincentivize tactical voting, even with the head-to-head runoff.
>> https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/1bbq6hu/heres_a_good_hypothetical_for_how_star_fails/
>
> I don't see how that's a failure. There's two possibilities here:
> 1. If the votes are honest, I don't see what the problem is. The three
> candidates are neck-and-neck and there's not much reason to prefer any.
> 2. If the votes are strategic, this seems like terrible strategy on the
> part of each group. Why wouldn't you give the center candidate more than 0
> stars?
>
> On Sat, Mar 16, 2024 at 11:52 AM robert bristow-johnson <
> rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:
>
>>
>> >
>> > On Thu, Mar 14, 2024 at 6:14 PM Michael Ossipoff <
>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>> > > Reply continued:
>> > >
>> > > Anyone who votes other than all-or-nothing in a public political
>> election is using poor strategy.
>> > >
>>
>> But requiring voters to use **any** strategy at all is IMO just
>> undesirable.  Incentivizing strategic or tactical voting is a burden, not a
>> desirable quality of a voting system.  This is why I think **any** Cardinal
>> system is flawed for competitive partisan voting in elections for public
>> office.
>>
>> > On 03/16/2024 2:27 PM EDT Closed Limelike Curves <
>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>> >
>> > And if voters want to do their part to elect the best candidate,
>> instead of playing strategic games, we should let them! We want honest
>> voting to be as easy as possible, because honest voting is a public good.
>> Filling in a bubble labeled 5/5 is no harder than filling one labeled 1/1.
>> But in real life I don't carry dice around very often.
>>
>> I'm really with Limelike here.  Except I think filling in a Score bubble
>> *does* require more thought than ranking even if the voter ends up bullet
>> voting.
>>
>> BTW, I posted at r/EndFPTP a derived scenario that shows how STAR fails
>> to disincentivize tactical voting, even with the head-to-head runoff.
>> https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/1bbq6hu/heres_a_good_hypothetical_for_how_star_fails/
>>
>> We don't wanna burden voters with any pressure to vote tactically, do
>> we?  Why are people (equal.vote, CES) promoting methods that, whenever
>> there are 3 or more candidates, **inherently** forces voters to make
>> tactical consideration of how they're going to vote for their 2nd-favorite
>> candidate?
>>
>> RCV can screw up.  And because of Condorcet cycles, even Condorcet RCV
>> will have those very few elections where it cannot prevent a spoiled
>> election (and the bad things that come along with spoiled election) because
>> of a cycle.  But, if we're gonna evaluate all of our votes equally, the
>> ranked ballot asks exactly the right questions whereas the Score ballot
>> requires more information from voters than should be demanded of them (or
>> the Approval ballot requires too little information, but there is *still*
>> tactical considerations required).  But with RCV, we **know** what to do
>> with our 2nd-favorite candidate: rank them #2.
>>
>> --
>>
>> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com
>>
>> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>>
>> .
>> .
>> .
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>>
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