[EM] Fwd: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 236, Issue 18

[Closed Limelike Curves]

>
> We don't wanna burden voters with any pressure to vote tactically, do we?
> Why are people (equal.vote, CES) promoting methods that, whenever there
> are 3 or more candidates, **inherently** forces voters to make tactical
> consideration of how they're going to vote for their 2nd-favorite candidate?
>
Every method does this. With 3 candidates all Condorcet methods can
encourage burial.

BTW, I posted at r/EndFPTP a derived scenario that shows how STAR fails to
> disincentivize tactical voting, even with the head-to-head runoff.
> https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/1bbq6hu/heres_a_good_hypothetical_for_how_star_fails/

I don't see how that's a failure. There's two possibilities here:
1. If the votes are honest, I don't see what the problem is. The three
candidates are neck-and-neck and there's not much reason to prefer any.
2. If the votes are strategic, this seems like terrible strategy on the
part of each group. Why wouldn't you give the center candidate more than 0
stars?

On Sat, Mar 16, 2024 at 11:52 AM robert bristow-johnson <
rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:

>
> >
> > On Thu, Mar 14, 2024 at 6:14 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > > Reply continued:
> > >
> > > Anyone who votes other than all-or-nothing in a public political
> election is using poor strategy.
> > >
>
> But requiring voters to use **any** strategy at all is IMO just
> undesirable.  Incentivizing strategic or tactical voting is a burden, not a
> desirable quality of a voting system.  This is why I think **any** Cardinal
> system is flawed for competitive partisan voting in elections for public
> office.
>
> > On 03/16/2024 2:27 PM EDT Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > And if voters want to do their part to elect the best candidate, instead
> of playing strategic games, we should let them! We want honest voting to be
> as easy as possible, because honest voting is a public good. Filling in a
> bubble labeled 5/5 is no harder than filling one labeled 1/1. But in real
> life I don't carry dice around very often.
>
> I'm really with Limelike here.  Except I think filling in a Score bubble
> *does* require more thought than ranking even if the voter ends up bullet
> voting.
>
> BTW, I posted at r/EndFPTP a derived scenario that shows how STAR fails to
> disincentivize tactical voting, even with the head-to-head runoff.
> https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/1bbq6hu/heres_a_good_hypothetical_for_how_star_fails/
>
> We don't wanna burden voters with any pressure to vote tactically, do we?
> Why are people (equal.vote, CES) promoting methods that, whenever there
> are 3 or more candidates, **inherently** forces voters to make tactical
> consideration of how they're going to vote for their 2nd-favorite candidate?
>
> RCV can screw up.  And because of Condorcet cycles, even Condorcet RCV
> will have those very few elections where it cannot prevent a spoiled
> election (and the bad things that come along with spoiled election) because
> of a cycle.  But, if we're gonna evaluate all of our votes equally, the
> ranked ballot asks exactly the right questions whereas the Score ballot
> requires more information from voters than should be demanded of them (or
> the Approval ballot requires too little information, but there is *still*
> tactical considerations required).  But with RCV, we **know** what to do
> with our 2nd-favorite candidate: rank them #2.
>
> --
>
> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
> .
> .
> .
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> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
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