[EM] Fwd: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 236, Issue 18

[Michael Ossipoff]

---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
Date: Tue, Mar 12, 2024 at 12:52
Subject: Re: [EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 236, Issue 18
To: robert bristow-johnson <rbj at audioimagination.com>


Who knows. I hope Progressives don’t. In public political elections with
Score, all-or-nothing rating is optimal, & I’d advise Progressives to rate
all-or-nothing.

The legitimate use for Score’s partial ratings would be only for when it’s
genuinely uncertain whether or not a candidate should get an approval.

That’s Score’s luxury-convenience.

But I don’t want it. In Approval, you can give a probabilistic partial
approval when it’s uncertain whether a candidate rates approval:

Flip a coin, to give hir 50% probability of approval. Or draw one of 3
numbers from a bag , for a 1/3 approval-probability.

Or number 10 paper squares of paper from 0 to 9, & twice draw one from the
bag (with replacement), to write a 2-digit number from 0 to 99.  …in order
to approve the candidate with any desired probability from 1% to 99%.

But don’t complicate & elaborate the method, don’t lose Approval’s absolute
minimalness & unique complete unarbitrariness, because you don’t want to do
something for yourself.

Don’t lose Approval’s uniquely easy proposal, implementation,
administration & security-auditing because you want Score to do partial
rating for you.

At EM, Robert recently made the same comment that he made here. I answered
it there.  …a long & thorough answer.

In the current poll, everyone participating, including me, is rating
sincerely in the Score ballotings because there’s no reason not to. Nothing
is at stake.

We have a rank-balloting, to be counted by RP(wv), to, strategy-free, show
the CW.


On Mon, Mar 11, 2024 at 22:07 robert bristow-johnson <
rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:

>
>
> > On 03/11/2024 11:22 PM EDT Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> > I wonder if what we really want is to take pairwise differences in
> scores, then calculate the median difference for each pair of candidates.
> That might give you a system that behaves like Condorcet but still accounts
> for intensity of preferences. (Is that a thing?)
> >
>
> Do you actually think that in a competitive partisan political election
> where voters have a stake in the outcome, want to prevail politically, and
> vote by secret ballot that they would mark their ballots honestly about
> intensity of preference?
>
> "My system is only intended for honest men." Jean-Charles de Borda
>
> --
>
> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
> .
> .
> .
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
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