[EM] Strategy-free criterion

[Closed Limelike Curves]

>
> I don’t know what the Twins-Litmus-Test is, but of course RP(wv) meets a
> number of criteria not met by MinMX(wv)

It's a stronger form of participation. It says that copying a set of voters
with the exact same preference shouldn't result in a worse outcome for all
of those voters.

On Thu, Jun 13, 2024 at 4:47 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
>
> On Thu, Jun 13, 2024 at 12:25 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>
>> Markus,
>>
>> Thanks for the interesting link.
>>
>> Quoting Mike Saari from March 1996:
>>
>> I want to emphasize, that even Smith//Condorcet[EM] fails to
>> meet this "Twins" Litmus Test.
>>
>>
>> What is the definition of the "Smith//Condorcet [EM]" method?
>>
>
> Probably Smith//MinMax(wv).
>
> I don’t know what the Twins-Litmus-Test is, but of course RP(wv) meets a
> number of criteria not met by MinMX(wv), &, as rare as it would be, a
> failure of Condorcet-Loser would be an embarrassment, & maybe result in a
> repeal.
>
> Of course Smith//MinMax(wv), too, fails some criteria met by RP(wv). I
> don’t know how embarrassing those failures would be, but arguably…
>
> “Elect the candidate unbeaten among all of the strongest pairwise-defeats
> that don’t contradict (form any cycles with) eachother.”
>
> …is simpler to word & propose than Smith//MinMax(wv).
>
>>
>>
>> Chris B.
>>
>> On 14/06/2024 12:50 am, Markus Schulze wrote:
>>
>> Hallo,
>>
>> in 1997, I proposed the following version for the
>> strategy-free criterion:
>>
>> *************************************************
>>    "X >> Y" means, that a majority of the voters prefers
>>    X to Y.
>>
>>    "There is a majority beat-path from X to Y," means,
>>    that X >> Y or there is a set of candidates
>>    C[1], ..., C[n] with X >> C[1] >> ... >> C[n] >> Y.
>>
>>    A method meets the "Generalized Majority
>>    Criterion" (GMC) if and only if:
>>    If there is a majority beat-path from A to B, but
>>    no majority beat-path from B to A, then B must not
>>    be elected.
>> *************************************************
>>
>> See:
>>
>> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/1997-October/001570.html
>>
>> Advantage of this version is that it is not necessary to
>> presume that there was a Condorcet winner when every
>> voter cast a complete ranking of all candidates.
>>
>> Markus Schulze
>>
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>> info
>>
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>>
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