<div dir="ltr"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">I don’t know what the Twins-Litmus-Test is, but of course RP(wv) meets a number of criteria not met by MinMX(wv)</blockquote><div>It's a stronger form of participation. It says that copying a set of voters with the exact same preference shouldn't result in a worse outcome for all of those voters.</div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Jun 13, 2024 at 4:47 PM Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com">email9648742@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><br></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Jun 13, 2024 at 12:25 Chris Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" target="_blank">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><u></u>
<div>
<p>Markus,<br>
<br>
Thanks for the interesting link.<br>
<br>
Quoting Mike Saari from March 1996:<br>
</p><blockquote type="cite">
<pre>I want to emphasize, that even Smith//Condorcet[EM] fails to
meet this "Twins" Litmus Test.</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
What is the definition of the "Smith//Condorcet [EM]" method?</div></blockquote><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Probably Smith//MinMax(wv).</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I don’t know what the Twins-Litmus-Test is, but of course RP(wv) meets a number of criteria not met by MinMX(wv), &, as rare as it would be, a failure of Condorcet-Loser would be an embarrassment, & maybe result in a repeal.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Of course Smith//MinMax(wv), too, fails some criteria met by RP(wv). I don’t know how embarrassing those failures would be, but arguably…</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">“Elect the candidate unbeaten among all of the strongest pairwise-defeats that don’t contradict (form any cycles with) eachother.”</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…is simpler to word & propose than Smith//MinMax(wv).</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto"><br>
<br>
Chris B.<br>
<br>
<p></p>
<div>On 14/06/2024 12:50 am, Markus Schulze
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">Hallo,
<br>
<br>
in 1997, I proposed the following version for the
<br>
strategy-free criterion:
<br>
<br>
*************************************************
<br>
"X >> Y" means, that a majority of the voters prefers
<br>
X to Y.
<br>
<br>
"There is a majority beat-path from X to Y," means,
<br>
that X >> Y or there is a set of candidates
<br>
C[1], ..., C[n] with X >> C[1] >> ... >> C[n]
>> Y.
<br>
<br>
A method meets the "Generalized Majority
<br>
Criterion" (GMC) if and only if:
<br>
If there is a majority beat-path from A to B, but
<br>
no majority beat-path from B to A, then B must not
<br>
be elected.
<br>
*************************************************
<br>
<br>
See:
<br>
<a>http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/1997-October/001570.html</a>
<br>
<br>
Advantage of this version is that it is not necessary to
<br>
presume that there was a Condorcet winner when every
<br>
voter cast a complete ranking of all candidates.
<br>
<br>
Markus Schulze
<br>
<br>
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<br>
</blockquote>
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