[EM] Strategy-free criterion

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi,

I want to note: Markus has priority for the invention, but Woodall later named the
exact same thing "CDTT" ("Condorcet (doubly augmented gross) top tier" which is the
name I have used. (I know Chris remembers CDTT.)

A votes-only (or matrix-only) interpretation of Mike's SFC is not so extensive as
this. It would say that if there is no X >> Y for some Y, but there is Y >> Z,
then Z isn't elected.

Kevin
votingmethods.net


Markus Schulze <markus.schulze8 at gmail.com> a écrit :
> Hallo,
> 
> in 1997, I proposed the following version for the
> strategy-free criterion:
> 
> *************************************************
>    "X >> Y" means, that a majority of the voters prefers
>    X to Y.
> 
>    "There is a majority beat-path from X to Y," means,
>    that X >> Y or there is a set of candidates
>    C[1], ..., C[n] with X >> C[1] >> ... >> C[n] >> Y.
> 
>    A method meets the "Generalized Majority
>    Criterion" (GMC) if and only if:
>    If there is a majority beat-path from A to B, but
>    no majority beat-path from B to A, then B must not
>    be elected.
> *************************************************
> 
> See:
> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/1997-October/001570.html
> 
> Advantage of this version is that it is not necessary to
> presume that there was a Condorcet winner when every
> voter cast a complete ranking of all candidates.
> 
> Markus Schulze