[EM] Regarding RCV, in poll & in November

[Michael Ossipoff]

One more thing:

I want to be explicit that RCV is my rank-method proposal, because
Condorcet is disqualified as I described.

RCV vs Approval:

They’re both excellent, for completely different reasons that make it
impossible to meaningfully say that one is better than the other.

RCV:

For proposing to a jurisdiction where public, activists &/or administrators
like, want intend, plan, know, or are familiar with RCV (or where RCV is
already proposed or on the ballot).

Approval:

Elsewhere.
———-
Why Approval where neither is known?:

I claim that an okay method that is enacted nationwide trumps a method
that’s strategy-free & strategically-ideal for progressives, but not
enacted nationwide yet.


…a bird 🐦 in the hand…

And what do RCVists say:

Don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good.

Bonuses:

Though RCV & Approval require the same amount of votecounting, both methods
allowing easy handcount-audit—Approval’s simpler count, without RCV’s
count-logistics-situation gives Approval somewhat of a security-edge.

Approval’s easier & less-expensive administration counts in its favor. …&
also helps security, because more money remains for security, due to the
less expensive administration.


On Sat, Jul 20, 2024 at 17:42 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Though I said that “ I don’t give a shit what the losers want”, & that the
> Mutual-Majority, rightfully, should be the ones to choose which of their
> candidates should be the ones who choose which if their candidate is
> elected…
>
> … & though I said that Condorcet is unnecessarily considerate [to those
> outside of the Mutual-Majority…
>
> Nonetheless I’ve wanted that unnecessary considerateness. In fact I’d
> still like it, to displease as few as possible.
>
> …if Condorcet didn’t have its problem of an overly
> computationally-intensive count.
>
> That’s why Condorcet ( in its best versions)  has been my ranked-method
> proposal.
>
> But Condorcet *does* have that problem, & so yes not having that
> unnecessary considerateness for the losers is perfectly okay.
>
>
> On Sat, Jul 20, 2024 at 15:34 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> When I reported preliminary poll-results I didn’t report about RCV or
>> STV, because there were small-electorate ties that prevent a typical count,
>> & require tiebreaking rules (which would have to have been stated before
>> the voting).
>>
>> But I applied two plausible nonrandom tiebreakers, &, by both of them,
>> RCV elected Biden.
>>
>> Note that, while RCV elected Biden, Approval returned an unresolvable tie
>> between Biden & the CW, Marianne Williamson.
>>
>> Approval thereby came closer to electing the CW, & more likely would
>> have, with a larger, but similarly-constituted, electorate.
>>
>> Approval doesn’t share rank-methods’ drastic compromise-strategy of
>> voting someone the voter like less, over someone s/he likes more.
>>
>> Therefore there’s certainly a strong case for not bothering with the
>> implementation-expense of rank-balloting, & instead just using Approval.
>> …which doesn’t have rank-methods’ worst-case strategy.
>>
>> Yes, defensive order-reversal needn’t happen in rank-methods.
>>
>> In the best Condorcet methods, no one needs defensive order-reversal (or,
>> really, due to autodeterence, *any* defensive strategy).
>>
>> But those methods are disqualified from public political elections, by
>> their enormous computational need, with consequent correspondingly-high
>> count-fraud vulnerability.
>>
>> Yes there are some Condorcet-Criterion complying methods that don’t need
>> the exhaustive pairwise count, but they haven’t been shown to have wv
>> Condorcet’s excellent strategy-properties.
>>
>> But RP(wv), MinMax(wv) or Smith//MinMax(wv) would be good for
>> single-winner choices in Parliament.
>>
>> For that purpose, might as well use the very best: RP(wv).
>>
>> ..& I like them for some polls, like the current one here, & Christina
>> Tobin’s Free-&-Equal polls.
>>
>> Not all polls. Some polls are better with RCV. Some are better with
>> Approval.
>>
>> What about RCV, in public political elections?
>>
>> For members of the Mutual-Majority, there’s absolutely no need for any
>> strategy. Just rank sincerely, & RCV is guaranteed to elect a candidate of
>> the Mutual-Majority.
>>
>> …the one with the best broad-support among the Mutual-Majority.
>>
>> Then why do the Republicans dislike RCV? Well, they’ve been finding that
>> they’re not in the Mutual-Majority.
>>
>> Which way did the transfers, & the win, go in Burlington & Alaska? The
>> Republicans can’t have not noticed that.
>>
>> There’s been a lot of criticism of RCV, because the situation isn’t as
>> good for those *not* in the Mutual-Majority.
>>
>> But:
>>
>> 1. Those outside the Mutual-Majority are still no worse off than they
>> were, with Plurality. …& aren’t the nonprogressives the ones who think that
>> Plurality is good enough?
>>
>> 2. Who says that a good method has to elect someone majority-unpreferred?
>>
>> Yes, when the Condorcet-complying methods elect the CW, they’re electing
>> the Mutual-Majority candidate most liked by those outside the
>> Mutual--Majority. That’s mighty considerate!  It’s unnecessarily
>> considerate.
>>
>> Who ever said that people not in the mutual-majority should gays say in
>> which Mutual-Majority candidate is elected?
>>
>> That’s the business of Mutual-Majority. *They* should choose which if
>> their candidates to elect.
>>
>> I don’t give a shit what the losers want.
>>
>> RCV always elects the candidate of the Mutual-Majority who has the best
>> broad-support among the Mutual-Majority.
>>
>> …& guess what: Most of the people wan what’s best for most of the people.
>>
>> i.e. The Progressives are the Mutual-Majority.
>>
>> They can’t lose in RCV.
>>
>> Then what about in my poll?
>>
>> A public election, in a jurisdiction where the Progressives have enacted
>> RCV is different.
>>
>> They certainly didn’t enact RCV so that they could bury someone they like
>> more, under someone they like less. …& so they won’t.
>>
>> Have I been critical of RCV? No!
>>
>> I’ve merely been critical of what I now (more politely) call the
>> FairVote-Fib (FF).
>>
>> The FF has given a good method a bad-name, a bad reputation.  …& has
>> turned a lot of people against a good method.
>>
>> The FF is Indy’s fib to Republicans (…&, I claim, to all Republocratic
>> candidates …& their minority of preferrers.
>>
>> But, to Progressives, it isn’t a fib at all.
>>
>> A sincere-ranking Mutual-Majority can’t lose in RCV.
>>
>> Yes I like Approval, & it has advantages.
>>
>> Approvals remains my main proposal to jurisdictions where there’s no
>> already-existent RCV proposal or even big public interest in one. …places
>> where there’s nothing happening yet with singl-winner reform.
>>
>> But, where there’s an RCV ballot-measure, & RCV is what’s on the
>> ballot…or anywhere where RCV is already what people want & are talking
>> about , then I support the RCV proposal.
>>
>> In the 35 years of the current RCV project, how many states use it
>> statewide: 2
>>
>> Hopefully that will soon be 4.
>>
>> But even then, &  if RCV keeps gaining 2 seats every 2 years, it will
>> take 46 years to succeed nationwide.
>>
>> Too slow.
>>
>> Approval with is minimalness, it’s minimal change from the status-quo, &
>> it’s zero implementation-expense, Approval could take off a LOT faster.
>>
>> Plurality lets you give a point to one candidate…& requires you to give
>> zero points to each of the others.
>>
>> It lets you rate one candidate “Yes”,  & requires you to rate all the
>> others “No”.
>>
>> What, it isn’t intended as points or ratings?
>>
>> Irrelevant—That’s the count result.
>>
>> Plurality forces you to ( usually insincerely, unwillingly &
>> complainingly) make some compromise that you despise beat your favorite.
>>
>> How Democratic is that coercion?
>>
>> With 3 or more candidates, democracy requires letting you express, &
>> have-counted, relative preference or merit among & across those candidates.
>>
>> If it forbids that expression, it isn’t democracy.
>>
>> Approval consists of no change other than dropping the current
>> antidemocratic forbidding of expression of merit & preference among &
>> across the candidates…dropping the artificial antidemocratic requirement to
>> rate all but one at zero, thereby forcing falsification of preferences.
>>
>>
>>
>>
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