<div dir="auto">One more thing: </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I want to be explicit that RCV is my rank-method proposal, because Condorcet is disqualified as I described.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">RCV vs Approval:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">They’re both excellent, for completely different reasons that make it impossible to meaningfully say that one is better than the other.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">RCV:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">For proposing to a jurisdiction where public, activists &/or administrators like, want intend, plan, know, or are familiar with RCV (or where RCV is already proposed or on the ballot).</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Approval: </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Elsewhere.</div><div dir="auto">———-</div><div dir="auto">Why Approval where neither is known?:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I claim that an okay method that is enacted nationwide trumps a method that’s strategy-free & strategically-ideal for progressives, but not enacted nationwide yet.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…a bird 🐦 in the hand…</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">And what do RCVists say: </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Bonuses:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Though RCV & Approval require the same amount of votecounting, both methods allowing easy handcount-audit—Approval’s simpler count, without RCV’s count-logistics-situation gives Approval somewhat of a security-edge.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Approval’s easier & less-expensive administration counts in its favor. …& also helps security, because more money remains for security, due to the less expensive administration.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br><div class="gmail_quote" dir="auto"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sat, Jul 20, 2024 at 17:42 Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com">email9648742@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto">Though I said that “ I don’t give a shit what the losers want”, & that the Mutual-Majority, rightfully, should be the ones to choose which of their candidates should be the ones who choose which if their candidate is elected…</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">… & though I said that Condorcet is unnecessarily considerate [to those outside of the Mutual-Majority…</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Nonetheless I’ve wanted that unnecessary considerateness. In fact I’d still like it, to displease as few as possible.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…if Condorcet didn’t have its problem of an overly computationally-intensive count.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">That’s why Condorcet ( in its best versions) has been my ranked-method proposal. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But Condorcet *does* have that problem, & so yes not having that unnecessary considerateness for the losers is perfectly okay.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sat, Jul 20, 2024 at 15:34 Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">When I reported preliminary poll-results I didn’t report about RCV or STV, because there were small-electorate ties that prevent a typical count, & require tiebreaking rules (which would have to have been stated before the voting).<div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But I applied two plausible nonrandom tiebreakers, &, by both of them, RCV elected Biden.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Note that, while RCV elected Biden, Approval returned an unresolvable tie between Biden & the CW, Marianne Williamson.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Approval thereby came closer to electing the CW, & more likely would have, with a larger, but similarly-constituted, electorate.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Approval doesn’t share rank-methods’ drastic compromise-strategy of voting someone the voter like less, over someone s/he likes more.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Therefore there’s certainly a strong case for not bothering with the implementation-expense of rank-balloting, & instead just using Approval. …which doesn’t have rank-methods’ worst-case strategy.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Yes, defensive order-reversal needn’t happen in rank-methods. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">In the best Condorcet methods, no one needs defensive order-reversal (or, really, due to autodeterence, *any* defensive strategy).</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But those methods are disqualified from public political elections, by their enormous computational need, with consequent correspondingly-high count-fraud vulnerability.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Yes there are some Condorcet-Criterion complying methods that don’t need the exhaustive pairwise count, but they haven’t been shown to have wv Condorcet’s excellent strategy-properties.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But RP(wv), MinMax(wv) or Smith//MinMax(wv) would be good for single-winner choices in Parliament. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">For that purpose, might as well use the very best: RP(wv).</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">..& I like them for some polls, like the current one here, & Christina Tobin’s Free-&-Equal polls.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Not all polls. Some polls are better with RCV. Some are better with Approval.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">What about RCV, in public political elections?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">For members of the Mutual-Majority, there’s absolutely no need for any strategy. Just rank sincerely, & RCV is guaranteed to elect a candidate of the Mutual-Majority.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…the one with the best broad-support among the Mutual-Majority.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Then why do the Republicans dislike RCV? Well, they’ve been finding that they’re not in the Mutual-Majority.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Which way did the transfers, & the win, go in Burlington & Alaska? The Republicans can’t have not noticed that.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">There’s been a lot of criticism of RCV, because the situation isn’t as good for those *not* in the Mutual-Majority. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">1. Those outside the Mutual-Majority are still no worse off than they were, with Plurality. …& aren’t the nonprogressives the ones who think that Plurality is good enough?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">2. Who says that a good method has to elect someone majority-unpreferred?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Yes, when the Condorcet-complying methods elect the CW, they’re electing the Mutual-Majority candidate most liked by those outside the Mutual--Majority. That’s mighty considerate! It’s unnecessarily considerate.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Who ever said that people not in the mutual-majority should gays say in which Mutual-Majority candidate is elected?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">That’s the business of Mutual-Majority. *They* should choose which if their candidates to elect. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I don’t give a shit what the losers want.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">RCV always elects the candidate of the Mutual-Majority who has the best broad-support among the Mutual-Majority.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…& guess what: Most of the people wan what’s best for most of the people.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">i.e. The Progressives are the Mutual-Majority.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">They can’t lose in RCV.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Then what about in my poll? </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">A public election, in a jurisdiction where the Progressives have enacted RCV is different.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">They certainly didn’t enact RCV so that they could bury someone they like more, under someone they like less. …& so they won’t.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Have I been critical of RCV? No!</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I’ve merely been critical of what I now (more politely) call the FairVote-Fib (FF).</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The FF has given a good method a bad-name, a bad reputation. …& has turned a lot of people against a good method.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The FF is Indy’s fib to Republicans (…&, I claim, to all Republocratic candidates …& their minority of preferrers.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But, to Progressives, it isn’t a fib at all. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">A sincere-ranking Mutual-Majority can’t lose in RCV.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Yes I like Approval, & it has advantages. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Approvals remains my main proposal to jurisdictions where there’s no already-existent RCV proposal or even big public interest in one. …places where there’s nothing happening yet with singl-winner reform. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But, where there’s an RCV ballot-measure, & RCV is what’s on the ballot…or anywhere where RCV is already what people want & are talking about , then I support the RCV proposal.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">In the 35 years of the current RCV project, how many states use it statewide: 2</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Hopefully that will soon be 4.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But even then, & if RCV keeps gaining 2 seats every 2 years, it will take 46 years to succeed nationwide.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Too slow.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Approval with is minimalness, it’s minimal change from the status-quo, & it’s zero implementation-expense, Approval could take off a LOT faster.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Plurality lets you give a point to one candidate…& requires you to give zero points to each of the others. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">It lets you rate one candidate “Yes”, & requires you to rate all the others “No”.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">What, it isn’t intended as points or ratings? </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Irrelevant—That’s the count result. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Plurality forces you to ( usually insincerely, unwillingly & complainingly) make some compromise that you despise beat your favorite. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">How Democratic is that coercion?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">With 3 or more candidates, democracy requires letting you express, & have-counted, relative preference or merit among & across those candidates. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If it forbids that expression, it isn’t democracy.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Approval consists of no change other than dropping the current antidemocratic forbidding of expression of merit & preference among & across the candidates…dropping the artificial antidemocratic requirement to rate all but one at zero, thereby forcing falsification of preferences.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div>
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