[EM] Autodeterrence introduction & definitions

[Michael Ossipoff]

Correct.

…but with our many lesser-evil voters, there’s a serious practical need for
Condorcet.

On Fri, Jan 12, 2024 at 13:16 Bob Richard [lists] <
lists001 at robertjrichard.com> wrote:

> There are possible cases where due to the ordinal ballots, a very weak
> winner can win, such as where there are two main candidates that polarise
> opinion (with less than half the support each) and a complete non-entity:
>
> 49: A>>>>C>B
> 49: B>>>>C>A
> 2: C
>
>
> (1) I'm not sure that C is actually the Condorcet winner here. I think we
> have A tied with B 49-49, A tied with C 49-49 and B tied with C 49-49. I
> think a more straightforward example of Toby's point is
>
> 48: A>>>>C>B
> 48: B>>>>C>A
>  3: C>A>B
>  1: C>B>A
>
> C beats B 52-48. C beats A 52-48. So C is the Condorcet winner. The IRV
> winner is A.
>
> (2) To most defenders of Condorcet, this is a strength, not a weakness. C
> *should* win in this example because (to oversimplify) the point of
> elections is to elect the median candidate.
>
> I am not a defender of Condorcet primarily because of exactly this
> situation. I believe that, in Toby's original example, the result should be
> a tie. In my example, where the 4 C voters have second and third choices,,
> they should get to break the tie in favor of A.
>
> My point is not to argue that A should win. My point is that who should
> win in this situations is a value judgment. My view is as much a value
> judgment as the contrary view that C should win. No amount of social choice
> theory or analysis of criteria compliance can dictate that judgment.
>
> --Bob Richard
>
> ------ Original Message ------
> From "Toby Pereira" <tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk>
> To "EM list" <election-methods at electorama.com>; "Michael Ossipoff" <
> email9648742 at gmail.com>
> Date 1/12/2024 11:41:37 AM
> Subject Re: [EM] Autodeterrence introduction & definitions
>
> It's not the *only* meaningful objection. Compared to, say, approval:
>
> It's more complex, including that results can't be given as a simple total.
>
> It fails consistency/participation.
>
> There are possible cases where due to the ordinal ballots, a very weak
> winner can win, such as where there are two main candidates that polarise
> opinion (with less than half the support each) and a complete non-entity:
>
> 49: A>>>>C>B
> 49: B>>>>C>A
> 2: C
>
> Toby
>
> On Thursday, 11 January 2024 at 18:45:57 GMT, Michael Ossipoff <
> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> The only meaningful objection to Condorcet is that it’s subject to
> offensive strategy, by “buria” (offensive order-reversal) & by offensive
> truncation.
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
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