<div dir="auto">Correct. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…but with our many lesser-evil voters, there’s a serious practical need for Condorcet.</div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Jan 12, 2024 at 13:16 Bob Richard [lists] <<a href="mailto:lists001@robertjrichard.com">lists001@robertjrichard.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div><div class="m_6312833843719064888quote"><div id="m_6312833843719064888x0fb50eaf98664697bac5e439207ed0a1"><div dir="ltr" style="background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);font-family:'Helvetica Neue',Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px;margin:0px">There are possible cases where due to the ordinal ballots, a very weak winner can win, such as where there are two main candidates that polarise opinion (with less than half the support each) and a complete non-entity:</div><div dir="ltr" style="background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);font-family:'Helvetica Neue',Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px;margin:0px"><br></div><div dir="ltr" style="background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);font-family:'Helvetica Neue',Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px;margin:0px">49: A>>>>C>B</div><div dir="ltr" style="background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);font-family:'Helvetica Neue',Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px;margin:0px">49: B>>>>C>A</div><div dir="ltr" style="background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);font-family:'Helvetica Neue',Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px;margin:0px">2: C</div><div dir="ltr" style="background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);font-family:'Helvetica Neue',Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px;margin:0px"><br></div><div dir="ltr" style="background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);font-family:'Helvetica Neue',Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px;margin:0px"></div></div></div></div>
<div style="clear:both"><br></div><div style="clear:both">(1) I'm not sure that C is actually the Condorcet winner here. I think we have A tied with B 49-49, A tied with C 49-49 and B tied with C 49-49. I think a more straightforward example of Toby's point is</div><div style="clear:both"><br></div><div style="clear:both">48: A>>>>C>B</div><div style="clear:both">48: B>>>>C>A</div><div style="clear:both"> 3: C>A>B</div><div style="clear:both"> 1: C>B>A</div><div style="clear:both"><br></div><div style="clear:both">C beats B 52-48. C beats A 52-48. So C is the Condorcet winner. The IRV winner is A.</div><div style="clear:both"><br></div>
<div>(2) To most defenders of Condorcet, this is a strength, not a weakness. C <u>should</u> win in this example because (to oversimplify) the point of elections is to elect the median candidate.</div><div><br></div><div>I am not a defender of Condorcet primarily because of exactly this situation. I believe that, in Toby's original example, the result should be a tie. In my example, where the 4 C voters have second and third choices,, they should get to break the tie in favor of A.</div><div><br></div><div>My point is not to argue that A should win. My point is that who should win in this situations is a value judgment. My view is as much a value judgment as the contrary view that C should win. No amount of social choice theory or analysis of criteria compliance can dictate that judgment.</div><div><span><br></span></div><div><span>--Bob Richard</span></div><div><br></div>
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<div>From "Toby Pereira" <<a href="mailto:tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk" target="_blank">tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk</a>></div>
<div>To "EM list" <<a href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com" target="_blank">election-methods@electorama.com</a>>; "Michael Ossipoff" <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>></div>
<div>Date 1/12/2024 11:41:37 AM</div>
<div>Subject Re: [EM] Autodeterrence introduction & definitions</div></div></div><div><div><br></div>
<div id="m_6312833843719064888x51c78fe675d942f"><blockquote cite="http://985574095.1444650.1705088497237@mail.yahoo.com" type="cite" class="m_6312833843719064888cite2">
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<div dir="ltr">It's not the *only* meaningful objection. Compared to, say, approval:</div><div dir="ltr"><br></div><div dir="ltr">It's more complex, including that results can't be given as a simple total.<div><div dir="ltr"><br style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Helvetica Neue,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif"></div></div></div><div dir="ltr">It fails consistency/participation.<br></div><div dir="ltr"><br></div><div dir="ltr">There are possible cases where due to the ordinal ballots, a very weak winner can win, such as where there are two main candidates that polarise opinion (with less than half the support each) and a complete non-entity:</div><div dir="ltr"><br></div><div dir="ltr">49: A>>>>C>B</div><div dir="ltr">49: B>>>>C>A</div><div dir="ltr">2: C</div><div dir="ltr"><br></div><div dir="ltr">Toby</div><div><br></div>
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On Thursday, 11 January 2024 at 18:45:57 GMT, Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>> wrote:
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<div><div id="m_6312833843719064888ydp867ae72dyiv9891586859"><div dir="ltr">
<p style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt"><span style="font-size:10pt">The
only meaningful objection to Condorcet is that it’s subject to offensive
strategy, by “buria” (offensive order-reversal) & by offensive truncation.
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