[EM] Autodeterrence introduction & definitions

[Bob Richard [lists]]

There are possible cases where due to the ordinal ballots, a very weak 
winner can win, such as where there are two main candidates that 
polarise opinion (with less than half the support each) and a complete 
non-entity:

49: A>>>>C>B
49: B>>>>C>A
2: C


(1) I'm not sure that C is actually the Condorcet winner here. I think 
we have A tied with B 49-49, A tied with C 49-49 and B tied with C 
49-49. I think a more straightforward example of Toby's point is

48: A>>>>C>B
48: B>>>>C>A
  3: C>A>B
  1: C>B>A

C beats B 52-48. C beats A 52-48. So C is the Condorcet winner. The IRV 
winner is A.

(2) To most defenders of Condorcet, this is a strength, not a weakness. 
C should win in this example because (to oversimplify) the point of 
elections is to elect the median candidate.

I am not a defender of Condorcet primarily because of exactly this 
situation. I believe that, in Toby's original example, the result should 
be a tie. In my example, where the 4 C voters have second and third 
choices,, they should get to break the tie in favor of A.

My point is not to argue that A should win. My point is that who should 
win in this situations is a value judgment. My view is as much a value 
judgment as the contrary view that C should win. No amount of social 
choice theory or analysis of criteria compliance can dictate that 
judgment.

--Bob Richard

------ Original Message ------
>From "Toby Pereira" <tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk>
To "EM list" <election-methods at electorama.com>; "Michael Ossipoff" 
<email9648742 at gmail.com>
Date 1/12/2024 11:41:37 AM
Subject Re: [EM] Autodeterrence introduction & definitions

>It's not the *only* meaningful objection. Compared to, say, approval:
>
>It's more complex, including that results can't be given as a simple 
>total.
>
>It fails consistency/participation.
>
>There are possible cases where due to the ordinal ballots, a very weak 
>winner can win, such as where there are two main candidates that 
>polarise opinion (with less than half the support each) and a complete 
>non-entity:
>
>49: A>>>>C>B
>49: B>>>>C>A
>2: C
>
>Toby
>
>On Thursday, 11 January 2024 at 18:45:57 GMT, Michael Ossipoff 
><email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>The only meaningful objection to Condorcet is that it’s subject to 
>offensive strategy, by “buria” (offensive order-reversal) & by 
>offensive truncation.
>
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