[EM] Autodeterrence introduction & definitions

[Michael Ossipoff]

Sure, it goes without saying that Approval is easier & less expensive to
implement.

I like Approval’s minimalness. For normal conditions Approval would be my
choice & my suggestion. Current conditions  are anything but normal.

I like the simplicity & directness of the Cardinal methods, as opposed to
the automatic-machines that are the rank-methods.

But, under current conditions, we have the many strongly-conditioned timid
lesser-evil voters who are overprone to topvote an evil (a lesser one).

They need Condorcet to reassure them & relieve them of that perceived need.

I can’t say that I care about Consistency or Participation. At least one of
those 2 has been violated by IRV lately, but it’s hardly IRV’s biggest
problem.

Weak winner, sure. If it weren’t for the lesser-evil giveaway-voter
problem, there wouldn’t be any particular reason to choose either of
{Condorcet, IRV} over the other…no particular reason why one guarantee,
purpose & principle is better than the other. The beats-all CW, vs the
favorite of the Mutual-Majority. It would be a matter of personal choice.
The CW, as often argued, can be very unfavorite. I’ve conducted votes in
which the CW was rejected. …& one in which the movie chosen as CW was
boring.

There’s much to like about the favorite of the Mutual-Majority. Maybe that
would be better, if it weren’t for the prevalence of lesser-evil voting.

But the CW has practical importance. …when not electing hir results in IRV
being rejected by an angry majority who were promised
majority-satisfaction.  …or when people find out that, contrary to
promises, their ballot doesn’t always protect their lesser-evil, & then
consequently start topranking an evil.

So, sure there are other objections to Condorcet, but I meant that the only
objection
regarding whether it works, is about vulnerability to offensive top-cycles.

That’s why my favorite Condorcet versions deal with that.



On Fri, Jan 12, 2024 at 11:42 Toby Pereira <tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:

> It's not the *only* meaningful objection. Compared to, say, approval:
>
> It's more complex, including that results can't be given as a simple total.
>
> It fails consistency/participation.
>
> There are possible cases where due to the ordinal ballots, a very weak
> winner can win, such as where there are two main candidates that polarise
> opinion (with less than half the support each) and a complete non-entity:
>
> 49: A>>>>C>B
> 49: B>>>>C>A
> 2: C
>
> Toby
>
> On Thursday, 11 January 2024 at 18:45:57 GMT, Michael Ossipoff <
> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> The only meaningful objection to Condorcet is that it’s subject to
> offensive strategy, by “buria” (offensive order-reversal) & by offensive
> truncation.
>
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