<div dir="auto">Sure, it goes without saying that Approval is easier & less expensive to implement.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I like Approval’s minimalness. For normal conditions Approval would be my choice & my suggestion. Current conditions are anything but normal. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I like the simplicity & directness of the Cardinal methods, as opposed to the automatic-machines that are the rank-methods.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But, under current conditions, we have the many strongly-conditioned timid lesser-evil voters who are overprone to topvote an evil (a lesser one).</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">They need Condorcet to reassure them & relieve them of that perceived need.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I can’t say that I care about Consistency or Participation. At least one of those 2 has been violated by IRV lately, but it’s hardly IRV’s biggest problem.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Weak winner, sure. If it weren’t for the lesser-evil giveaway-voter problem, there wouldn’t be any particular reason to choose either of {Condorcet, IRV} over the other…no particular reason why one guarantee, purpose & principle is better than the other. The beats-all CW, vs the favorite of the Mutual-Majority. It would be a matter of personal choice. The CW, as often argued, can be very unfavorite. I’ve conducted votes in which the CW was rejected. …& one in which the movie chosen as CW was boring.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">There’s much to like about the favorite of the Mutual-Majority. Maybe that would be better, if it weren’t for the prevalence of lesser-evil voting.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But the CW has practical importance. …when not electing hir results in IRV being rejected by an angry majority who were promised majority-satisfaction. …or when people find out that, contrary to promises, their ballot doesn’t always protect their lesser-evil, & then consequently start topranking an evil.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">So, sure there are other objections to Condorcet, but I meant that the only objection </div><div dir="auto">regarding whether it works, is about vulnerability to offensive top-cycles.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">That’s why my favorite Condorcet versions deal with that.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Jan 12, 2024 at 11:42 Toby Pereira <<a href="mailto:tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk">tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div style="font-family:Helvetica Neue,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px"><div></div>
<div dir="ltr">It's not the *only* meaningful objection. Compared to, say, approval:</div><div dir="ltr"><br></div><div dir="ltr">It's more complex, including that results can't be given as a simple total.<div><div dir="ltr"><br style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Helvetica Neue,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif"></div></div></div><div dir="ltr">It fails consistency/participation.<br></div><div dir="ltr"><br></div><div dir="ltr">There are possible cases where due to the ordinal ballots, a very weak winner can win, such as where there are two main candidates that polarise opinion (with less than half the support each) and a complete non-entity:</div><div dir="ltr"><br></div><div dir="ltr">49: A>>>>C>B</div><div dir="ltr">49: B>>>>C>A</div><div dir="ltr">2: C</div></div></div><div><div style="font-family:Helvetica Neue,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px"><div dir="ltr"><br></div><div dir="ltr">Toby</div><div><br></div>
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On Thursday, 11 January 2024 at 18:45:57 GMT, Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>> wrote:
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<p style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt"><span style="font-size:10pt">The
only meaningful objection to Condorcet is that it’s subject to offensive
strategy, by “buria” (offensive order-reversal) & by offensive truncation.</span><br></p></div></div></div>
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