[EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?

[Michael Ossipoff]

I’d have to understand it better. I’ll study it.

If Median-Ratings is like Majority-Judgment, its need for a special
tiebreaker complicates it. Simplicity is important for a 1st Condorcet
proposal.

When you described it, I assumed that it was Majority-Judgment—but now I’ll
take a closer look.

So, till then…

On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 15:05 Ted Stern <dodecatheon at gmail.com> wrote:

> Michael,
>
> I see you like Condorcet//Approval(implicit).
>
> What about Condorcet//Median Ratings?
>
> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024, 09:07 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Nanson has precedent, but it doesn’t have the simplicity of some of the
>> other Condorcet-compliant methods.
>>
>> …& how does Nanson do by freedom from need for defensive-strategy
>> (against offensive-strategy)?
>>
>> Achieving the best strategy-free-ness is the goal of Condorcet.
>>
>> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 12:08 Bob Richard [lists] <
>> lists001 at robertjrichard.com> wrote:
>>
>>> A Condorcet-compliant method, Nanson, was used in the small city of
>>> Marquette, Michigan in the 1920s. It would be very instructive to learn why
>>> it was repealed. I have never seen anything more than a passing mention of
>>> this episode, so this research would probably involve traveling to
>>> Marquette and rummaging around in newspaper archives, county election
>>> records and the public library. On the other hand, this part of Michigan is
>>> a beautiful place to visit. Any takers?
>>>
>>> --Bob Richard
>>>
>>> ------ Original Message ------
>>> From "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>> To "EM list" <election-methods at electorama.com>
>>> Date 1/10/2024 11:34:57 AM
>>> Subject [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?
>>>
>>> That question was recently asked.
>>>
>>> Condorcet has many versions, & there’s no agreement on that matter.
>>>
>>> So Condorcet doesn’t have any enactment-projects, or even an
>>> organization.
>>>
>>> Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few candidates,
>>> in the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence its
>>> particularly great unfamiliarity.
>>>
>>> Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully reassure
>>> our thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn’t too-vote an
>>> evil.
>>>
>>> How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in
>>> various nonpolitical votes.
>>>
>>> Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a
>>> voting-system reform. That’s happened for RCV.
>>>
>>> …or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise happened
>>> for RCV.
>>>
>>> But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, online,
>>> in the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, for
>>> the pursuit of an initiative.
>>>
>>> Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, such
>>> as:
>>>
>>> MinMax(wv)
>>> CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA).
>>>
>>> Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles.
>>>
>>> Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the
>>> defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don’t like & don’t wish
>>> to beat the CW via burial.
>>>
>>> That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, to
>>> find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of
>>> initiative-enactment.
>>>
>>> Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that
>>> focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked to
>>> approve (only) the proposal(s) that they’d support in an initiative.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>>
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>>
>
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