[EM] Question to the Condorcetists

Thu Feb 29 23:34:26 PST 2024

Oops !! I was treated the number of voters as if it were the number of
candidates.

Actually a complete thorough Participation-violation-check would take half
as long as the initial Condorcet exhaustive pairwise-count.

…about 57 billion individual pairwise-votes to count, vs 114 billion.

…for 300 million voters & 20 candidates.

I doubt that either would be a problem for a modern computer.

On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 23:21 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
>
>
> The point is that I didn't need to analyze every individual ballot. I
>> started with the results and worked in the other direction. A similar
>> approach can be used with Participation.
>>
>
> Yes, but a complete thorough check for Participation-violation would take
> about a million times less time than the original exhaustive pairwise-count
> would require.
>
>>
>> On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 7:16 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>individually-considered
>> as not showing up, all that’s needed is to decrement the pairwise
>> vote-totals that s/he’d added to.
>>
>
>>> Much less votecounting than what would be needed if it were necessary to
>>> keep repeating the whole exhaustive pairwise count, as I’d previously
>>> assumed.
>>>
>>> So surely the Participation-check would be computationally-feasible.
>>>
>>> On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 18:09 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> With V voters, the number of individual pairwiwe-preference-votes that
>>>> need to be counted in order to test for Participation-failure is
>>>> proportional to V^4.  I don't know how fast the fastest computers are, but
>>>> might that be computationally feasible?
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 2:43 PM Sass <sass at equal.vote> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> I recently made a meme relevant to this topic:
>>>>>
>>>>> https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/17y3fsb/pairwise_comparisonsequential_elimination/
>>>>>
>>>>> Just like IIA and Cloneproofness and so many other criteria failed by
>>>>> many Condorcet methods,  Participation only matters in elections when there
>>>>> is not a Condorcet Winner (CW), which means it only creates an actionable
>>>>> strategy when someone can predict that a given election will not have a CW.
>>>>>
>>>>> I tend to prefer cardinal methods because of the increased
>>>>> expressivity and reduced cognitive load on the voter, but the more I think
>>>>> about Condorcet methods, the more impenetrable they seem. It just comes
>>>>> down to explaining it to voters and legal viability. That's why I like
>>>>> "elect the candidate who is preferred over the most others" as a method
>>>>> (i.e. Ranked Robin (i.e. Copeland)).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 1:03 PM <
>>>>> election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com> wrote:
>>>>>
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>>>>>> Today's Topics:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>    1. Question to the Condorcetists (Closed Limelike Curves)
>>>>>>    2. Re: Question to the Condorcetists (Michael Ossipoff)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Message: 1
>>>>>> Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 10:36:40 -0800
>>>>>> From: Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com>
>>>>>> To: election-methods at electorama.com
>>>>>> Subject: [EM] Question to the Condorcetists
>>>>>> Message-ID:
>>>>>>         <CA+euzPi2VRg_Z_4C32zCE+t=gu4OXAjoffs=_sch=
>>>>>> UXH6V3CYg at mail.gmail.com>
>>>>>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet
>>>>>> methods
>>>>>> have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
>>>>>> vulnerable
>>>>>> to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen
>>>>>> in
>>>>>> Germany.
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>>>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Message: 2
>>>>>> Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 11:32:43 -0800
>>>>>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>>>>> To: Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com>
>>>>>> Cc: election-methods at electorama.com
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [EM] Question to the Condorcetists
>>>>>> Message-ID:
>>>>>>         <CAOKDY5DX=s7TsxiX5ir1eM=PG2y1176YVEs_L0L=
>>>>>> pJ3+V_CDRQ at mail.gmail.com>
>>>>>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It?s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>>>>>> Germany, because, here, even Hare?s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It?s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn?t.
>>>>>> Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it?s
>>>>>> participation-failure, a pass.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I?ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
>>>>>> incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable
>>>>>> price for
>>>>>> the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
>>>>>> improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is
>>>>>> probably
>>>>>> irrelevant to strategy.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out,
>>>>>> shows that
>>>>>> single-winner elections aren?t perfect.  ?making a good argument for
>>>>>> PR?*monotonic* PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world?s countries), Germany
>>>>>> feels
>>>>>> no need to compromise participation.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We?re told that list-PR ?hasn?t been tried?. No, just in 2/3 of the
>>>>>> world?s
>>>>>> countries for about a century.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But, with that counterfactual ?hasn?t been tried? excuse, we?re stuck
>>>>>> in
>>>>>> the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved
>>>>>> on to
>>>>>> democracy.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> > Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet
>>>>>> methods
>>>>>> > have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
>>>>>> vulnerable
>>>>>> > to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as
>>>>>> seen in
>>>>>> > Germany.
>>>>>> > ----
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>>>>>> > info
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