[EM] Question to the Condorcetists

Thu Feb 29 23:21:42 PST 2024

The point is that I didn't need to analyze every individual ballot. I
> started with the results and worked in the other direction. A similar
> approach can be used with Participation.
>

Yes, but a complete thorough check for Participation-violation would take
about a million times less time than the original exhaustive pairwise-count
would require.

>
> On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 7:16 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>individually-considered
> as not showing up, all that’s needed is to decrement the pairwise
> vote-totals that s/he’d added to.
>
>>
>> Much less votecounting than what would be needed if it were necessary to
>> keep repeating the whole exhaustive pairwise count, as I’d previously
>> assumed.
>>
>> So surely the Participation-check would be computationally-feasible.
>>
>> On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 18:09 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> With V voters, the number of individual pairwiwe-preference-votes that
>>> need to be counted in order to test for Participation-failure is
>>> proportional to V^4.  I don't know how fast the fastest computers are, but
>>> might that be computationally feasible?
>>>
>>> On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 2:43 PM Sass <sass at equal.vote> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I recently made a meme relevant to this topic:
>>>>
>>>> https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/17y3fsb/pairwise_comparisonsequential_elimination/
>>>>
>>>> Just like IIA and Cloneproofness and so many other criteria failed by
>>>> many Condorcet methods,  Participation only matters in elections when there
>>>> is not a Condorcet Winner (CW), which means it only creates an actionable
>>>> strategy when someone can predict that a given election will not have a CW.
>>>>
>>>> I tend to prefer cardinal methods because of the increased expressivity
>>>> and reduced cognitive load on the voter, but the more I think about
>>>> Condorcet methods, the more impenetrable they seem. It just comes down to
>>>> explaining it to voters and legal viability. That's why I like "elect the
>>>> candidate who is preferred over the most others" as a method (i.e. Ranked
>>>> Robin (i.e. Copeland)).
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 1:03 PM <
>>>> election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com> wrote:
>>>>
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>>>>> Today's Topics:
>>>>>
>>>>>    1. Question to the Condorcetists (Closed Limelike Curves)
>>>>>    2. Re: Question to the Condorcetists (Michael Ossipoff)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>
>>>>> Message: 1
>>>>> Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 10:36:40 -0800
>>>>> From: Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com>
>>>>> To: election-methods at electorama.com
>>>>> Subject: [EM] Question to the Condorcetists
>>>>> Message-ID:
>>>>>         <CA+euzPi2VRg_Z_4C32zCE+t=gu4OXAjoffs=_sch=
>>>>> UXH6V3CYg at mail.gmail.com>
>>>>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>>>>>
>>>>> Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet
>>>>> methods
>>>>> have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
>>>>> vulnerable
>>>>> to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen
>>>>> in
>>>>> Germany.
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>>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>>
>>>>> Message: 2
>>>>> Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 11:32:43 -0800
>>>>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>>>> To: Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com>
>>>>> Cc: election-methods at electorama.com
>>>>> Subject: Re: [EM] Question to the Condorcetists
>>>>> Message-ID:
>>>>>         <CAOKDY5DX=s7TsxiX5ir1eM=PG2y1176YVEs_L0L=
>>>>> pJ3+V_CDRQ at mail.gmail.com>
>>>>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>>>>>
>>>>> It?s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>>>>> Germany, because, here, even Hare?s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>>>>
>>>>> It?s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn?t.
>>>>> Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it?s
>>>>> participation-failure, a pass.
>>>>>
>>>>> I?ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
>>>>> incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price
>>>>> for
>>>>> the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
>>>>> improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is
>>>>> probably
>>>>> irrelevant to strategy.
>>>>>
>>>>> But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows
>>>>> that
>>>>> single-winner elections aren?t perfect.  ?making a good argument for
>>>>> PR?*monotonic* PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
>>>>>
>>>>> Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world?s countries), Germany
>>>>> feels
>>>>> no need to compromise participation.
>>>>>
>>>>> We?re told that list-PR ?hasn?t been tried?. No, just in 2/3 of the
>>>>> world?s
>>>>> countries for about a century.
>>>>>
>>>>> But, with that counterfactual ?hasn?t been tried? excuse, we?re stuck
>>>>> in
>>>>> the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved
>>>>> on to
>>>>> democracy.
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> > Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet
>>>>> methods
>>>>> > have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
>>>>> vulnerable
>>>>> > to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as
>>>>> seen in
>>>>> > Germany.
>>>>> > ----
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