[EM] Fwd: Poll, preliminary ballots
Michael Ossipoff
email9648742 at gmail.com
Fri Apr 26 22:10:26 PDT 2024
On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 16:13 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
> I agree; you can simplify it by just taking "beats" to mean
> "majority-beats" and then describing the Smith set. I think this *might*
> restore later-no-help as well, if you use Majority-Smith//Score? It might
> even satisfy all of Generalized Strategy-Free, No Lesser Evils, minimal
> defense, and later-no-help.
>
Write definition & rules for it, & test it for those compliances. If it
does all that, plus the Condorcet Criterion that’s pretty good. …if No
Lesser Evils means FBC.
BTW, It would be a good idea to always tell people that, by “No Lesser
Evils”, you mean FBC.
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 3:25 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 13:43 Closed Limelike Curves <
>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> EVC=Equal Vote Coalition.
>>>
>>> Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable
>>>> as to be strategically irrelevant.
>>>
>>>
>> Roughly the same could be said for Improved Condorcet failing the
>>> simple-Condorcet criterion.
>>>
>>
>> Improves Condorcet gets rid of that rare failure, but is more complicated
>> to propose.
>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 12:01 PM Michael Ossipoff <
>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
>>>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>>> Date: Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:59
>>>> Subject: Re: [EM] Poll, preliminary ballots
>>>> To: Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:41 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Yup, but I prefer "No lesser evils" (and I think EVC does too).
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> (I accidentally didn’t send my reply to the list)
>>>>
>>>> Who is EVC?
>>>>
>>>> Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable
>>>> as to be strategically irrelevant.
>>>>
>>>> But the inadequate Condorcet versions fail FBC in a more
>>>> problematic way. Those versions include margins Condorcet; CW,Plurality; &
>>>> CW,Top-2-Runoff.
>>>>
>>>> WV Condorcet, due to its autodeterence doesn’t have that failure.
>>>> Green-Armitage found that various hybrids of IRV & Condorcet, as well, are
>>>> resistant to offensive strategy.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:33 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:19 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> No favorite betrayal.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You mean FBC, I presume.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:17 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Closed, what is the No Lesser Evils Criterion?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 12:16 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper
>>>>>>>>>> ballot.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the
>>>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one
>>>>>>>>>> oval per
>>>>>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>>>>>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially if
>>>>>>>>> you use more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give
>>>>>>>>> non-overlapping scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a
>>>>>>>>> digit in base k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with
>>>>>>>>> options for quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through
>>>>>>>>> F, with +/- options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique
>>>>>>>>> scores for up to 18 (!) candidates.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> (Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
>>>>>>>>> outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
>>>>>>>>> electionmethods at votefair.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer
>>>>>>>>>> of a car
>>>>>>>>>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another
>>>>>>>>>> kludge on it
>>>>>>>>>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the
>>>>>>>>>> most
>>>>>>>>>> recent one.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof,
>>>>>>>>>> doors,
>>>>>>>>>> etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine,
>>>>>>>>>> drive
>>>>>>>>>> train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes,
>>>>>>>>>> new
>>>>>>>>>> engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
>>>>>>>>>> designed
>>>>>>>>>> body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a well-designed
>>>>>>>>>> car.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using
>>>>>>>>>> ranked
>>>>>>>>>> choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
>>>>>>>>>> assuming
>>>>>>>>>> the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least
>>>>>>>>>> popular is
>>>>>>>>>> the "body" that isn't well designed.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing
>>>>>>>>>> unlimited strict
>>>>>>>>>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
>>>>>>>>>> relatively benign
>>>>>>>>>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
>>>>>>>>>> rules. In
>>>>>>>>>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned
>>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>>> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you
>>>>>>>>>> from ranking
>>>>>>>>>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each
>>>>>>>>>> candidate) in
>>>>>>>>>> a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper
>>>>>>>>>> ballot.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the
>>>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one
>>>>>>>>>> oval per
>>>>>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as
>>>>>>>>>> many
>>>>>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting
>>>>>>>>>> two or
>>>>>>>>>> more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" --
>>>>>>>>>> stops
>>>>>>>>>> us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
>>>>>>>>>> most-disliked
>>>>>>>>>> candidate.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
>>>>>>>>>> way, this
>>>>>>>>>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>>>>>> > that sum to 1.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal
>>>>>>>>>> numbers work
>>>>>>>>>> fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
>>>>>>>>>> Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> > But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
>>>>>>>>>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots
>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>> can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
>>>>>>>>>> top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking
>>>>>>>>>> the same
>>>>>>>>>> four candidates highest. Etc.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> >>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
>>>>>>>>>> stopping you
>>>>>>>>>> >>> from giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> >> Time and money.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
>>>>>>>>>> > mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
>>>>>>>>>> > just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
>>>>>>>>>> > somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
>>>>>>>>>> projects.
>>>>>>>>>> That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here
>>>>>>>>>> as I'd
>>>>>>>>>> like.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That
>>>>>>>>>> makes
>>>>>>>>>> them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write
>>>>>>>>>> clearly!
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Richard Fobes
>>>>>>>>>> The VoteFair guy
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> > Richard,
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> >> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to
>>>>>>>>>> improve
>>>>>>>>>> >> single-winner score voting.
>>>>>>>>>> > It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
>>>>>>>>>> > Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If
>>>>>>>>>> it is an
>>>>>>>>>> > attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great
>>>>>>>>>> difficulty
>>>>>>>>>> > believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> >> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
>>>>>>>>>> stopping you from
>>>>>>>>>> >> > giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>> >> Time and money.
>>>>>>>>>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
>>>>>>>>>> mass media
>>>>>>>>>> > or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just
>>>>>>>>>> talking about
>>>>>>>>>> > just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous)
>>>>>>>>>> discussion here.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> >> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting
>>>>>>>>>> limitations of
>>>>>>>>>> >> plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>> >> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you
>>>>>>>>>> read my
>>>>>>>>>> > previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places
>>>>>>>>>> on the
>>>>>>>>>> > voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka
>>>>>>>>>> FPP).
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
>>>>>>>>>> Push-over
>>>>>>>>>> > incentive.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> >> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
>>>>>>>>>> ballot
>>>>>>>>>> >> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
>>>>>>>>>> that point.
>>>>>>>>>> >> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>>>>> >> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable
>>>>>>>>>> to Push-over
>>>>>>>>>> >> > strategy.
>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>> >> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
>>>>>>>>>> Gollum,
>>>>>>>>>> >> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation
>>>>>>>>>> means the
>>>>>>>>>> >> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing
>>>>>>>>>> unlimited strict
>>>>>>>>>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
>>>>>>>>>> relatively benign
>>>>>>>>>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
>>>>>>>>>> rules. In
>>>>>>>>>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned
>>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>>> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
>>>>>>>>>> ranking
>>>>>>>>>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> >> I've written code that correctly counts so-called
>>>>>>>>>> "overvotes." It's not
>>>>>>>>>> >> a "complex procedure":
>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>>>>>> >> When shared preference levels are encountered,
>>>>>>>>>> >> // the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
>>>>>>>>>> >> // not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
>>>>>>>>>> >> // decimal portions. For example, during a
>>>>>>>>>> >> // counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
>>>>>>>>>> >> // rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
>>>>>>>>>> >> // highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
>>>>>>>>>> >> // transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
>>>>>>>>>> >> // will transfer to candidate 2.
>>>>>>>>>> >> //
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
>>>>>>>>>> way, this
>>>>>>>>>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>>>>>> > that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or
>>>>>>>>>> someone votes
>>>>>>>>>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex
>>>>>>>>>> procedure" I
>>>>>>>>>> > referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
>>>>>>>>>> describing it.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or
>>>>>>>>>> Benham,
>>>>>>>>>> > then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than
>>>>>>>>>> one
>>>>>>>>>> > candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
>>>>>>>>>> candidates
>>>>>>>>>> > by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
>>>>>>>>>> > (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as
>>>>>>>>>> a third
>>>>>>>>>> > of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be
>>>>>>>>>> fine for
>>>>>>>>>> > this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
>>>>>>>>>> > eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
>>>>>>>>>> strategising
>>>>>>>>>> > easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining
>>>>>>>>>> candidates)
>>>>>>>>>> > ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of
>>>>>>>>>> the ones
>>>>>>>>>> > they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional
>>>>>>>>>> order.
>>>>>>>>>> > (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B
>>>>>>>>>> was higher
>>>>>>>>>> > in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but
>>>>>>>>>> I think
>>>>>>>>>> > you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
>>>>>>>>>> above-bottom
>>>>>>>>>> > equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think
>>>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>>> > would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I
>>>>>>>>>> don't
>>>>>>>>>> > advocate allowing it for those methods.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> >> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But
>>>>>>>>>> those were
>>>>>>>>>> >> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>>>>>> >> center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>>>>>> > It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable
>>>>>>>>>> methods fail
>>>>>>>>>> > IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
>>>>>>>>>> "center-squeeze"
>>>>>>>>>> > just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the
>>>>>>>>>> precise
>>>>>>>>>> > definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer
>>>>>>>>>> of a car
>>>>>>>>>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
>>>>>>>>>> on it
>>>>>>>>>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>>>>>>>>>> recent one.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > Chris B.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org
>>>>>>>>>> > <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
>>>>>>>>>> ?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
>>>>>>>>>> 40votefair.org%3E>
>>>>>>>>>> > /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
>>>>>>>>>> > > ...
>>>>>>>>>> > > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
>>>>>>>>>> > > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to
>>>>>>>>>> improve
>>>>>>>>>> > single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when
>>>>>>>>>> voting is
>>>>>>>>>> > not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be
>>>>>>>>>> hidden.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
>>>>>>>>>> stopping you from
>>>>>>>>>> > > giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at
>>>>>>>>>> FairVote, and
>>>>>>>>>> > academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
>>>>>>>>>> > election-method reform.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > >> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no
>>>>>>>>>> way to avoid it.
>>>>>>>>>> > > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater
>>>>>>>>>> than with
>>>>>>>>>> > > FPP. ...
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations
>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>> > plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
>>>>>>>>>> "overvotes."
>>>>>>>>>> > >> RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
>>>>>>>>>> > > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
>>>>>>>>>> ballot
>>>>>>>>>> > > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
>>>>>>>>>> that point.
>>>>>>>>>> > > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>>>>> > > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable
>>>>>>>>>> to Push-over
>>>>>>>>>> > > strategy.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
>>>>>>>>>> Gollum,
>>>>>>>>>> > Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation
>>>>>>>>>> means the
>>>>>>>>>> > evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
>>>>>>>>>> It's not
>>>>>>>>>> > a "complex procedure":
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm
>>>>>>>>>> "buying" by
>>>>>>>>>> > >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
>>>>>>>>>> > > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
>>>>>>>>>> failures, you
>>>>>>>>>> > > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the
>>>>>>>>>> argument "Let's
>>>>>>>>>> > > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
>>>>>>>>>> that we can
>>>>>>>>>> > > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
>>>>>>>>>> > > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by
>>>>>>>>>> IRV so that
>>>>>>>>>> > > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But
>>>>>>>>>> those were
>>>>>>>>>> > not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>>>>>> > center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about
>>>>>>>>>> convoluted
>>>>>>>>>> > scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that
>>>>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>>>>> > really want to understand why I rank some methods better than
>>>>>>>>>> others.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > Richard Fobes
>>>>>>>>>> > The VoteFair guy
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > ----
>>>>>>>>>> > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em
>>>>>>>>>> for list info
>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em
>>>>>>>>>> for list info
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ----
>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>>> info
>>>>
>>>
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