[EM] Fwd: Poll, preliminary ballots
Closed Limelike Curves
closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com
Fri Apr 26 16:13:12 PDT 2024
I agree; you can simplify it by just taking "beats" to mean
"majority-beats" and then describing the Smith set. I think this *might*
restore later-no-help as well, if you use Majority-Smith//Score? It might
even satisfy all of Generalized Strategy-Free, No Lesser Evils, minimal
defense, and later-no-help.
On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 3:25 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:
>
>
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 13:43 Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> EVC=Equal Vote Coalition.
>>
>> Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable
>>> as to be strategically irrelevant.
>>
>>
> Roughly the same could be said for Improved Condorcet failing the
>> simple-Condorcet criterion.
>>
>
> Improves Condorcet gets rid of that rare failure, but is more complicated
> to propose.
>
>>
>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 12:01 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
>>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>> Date: Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:59
>>> Subject: Re: [EM] Poll, preliminary ballots
>>> To: Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:41 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Yup, but I prefer "No lesser evils" (and I think EVC does too).
>>>>
>>>
>>> (I accidentally didn’t send my reply to the list)
>>>
>>> Who is EVC?
>>>
>>> Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable
>>> as to be strategically irrelevant.
>>>
>>> But the inadequate Condorcet versions fail FBC in a more
>>> problematic way. Those versions include margins Condorcet; CW,Plurality; &
>>> CW,Top-2-Runoff.
>>>
>>> WV Condorcet, due to its autodeterence doesn’t have that failure.
>>> Green-Armitage found that various hybrids of IRV & Condorcet, as well, are
>>> resistant to offensive strategy.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:33 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:19 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> No favorite betrayal.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> You mean FBC, I presume.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:17 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Closed, what is the No Lesser Evils Criterion?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 12:16 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper
>>>>>>>>> ballot.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
>>>>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one
>>>>>>>>> oval per
>>>>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>>>>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially if
>>>>>>>> you use more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give
>>>>>>>> non-overlapping scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a
>>>>>>>> digit in base k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with
>>>>>>>> options for quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through
>>>>>>>> F, with +/- options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique
>>>>>>>> scores for up to 18 (!) candidates.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
>>>>>>>> outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
>>>>>>>> electionmethods at votefair.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer
>>>>>>>>> of a car
>>>>>>>>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
>>>>>>>>> on it
>>>>>>>>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>>>>>>>>> recent one.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof,
>>>>>>>>> doors,
>>>>>>>>> etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
>>>>>>>>> train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes,
>>>>>>>>> new
>>>>>>>>> engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly
>>>>>>>>> designed
>>>>>>>>> body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a well-designed
>>>>>>>>> car.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using
>>>>>>>>> ranked
>>>>>>>>> choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of
>>>>>>>>> assuming
>>>>>>>>> the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least
>>>>>>>>> popular is
>>>>>>>>> the "body" that isn't well designed.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing
>>>>>>>>> unlimited strict
>>>>>>>>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
>>>>>>>>> relatively benign
>>>>>>>>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
>>>>>>>>> rules. In
>>>>>>>>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>>>>>>>>> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
>>>>>>>>> ranking
>>>>>>>>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each
>>>>>>>>> candidate) in
>>>>>>>>> a box. So you only need one box per candidate.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper
>>>>>>>>> ballot.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the
>>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one
>>>>>>>>> oval per
>>>>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as
>>>>>>>>> many
>>>>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two
>>>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>>>> more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" --
>>>>>>>>> stops
>>>>>>>>> us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
>>>>>>>>> most-disliked
>>>>>>>>> candidate.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
>>>>>>>>> way, this
>>>>>>>>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>>>>> > that sum to 1.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal
>>>>>>>>> numbers work
>>>>>>>>> fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
>>>>>>>>> Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> > But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
>>>>>>>>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
>>>>>>>>> top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the
>>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>>> four candidates highest. Etc.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> >>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
>>>>>>>>> stopping you
>>>>>>>>> >>> from giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> >> Time and money.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
>>>>>>>>> > mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was
>>>>>>>>> > just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
>>>>>>>>> > somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of
>>>>>>>>> projects.
>>>>>>>>> That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here
>>>>>>>>> as I'd
>>>>>>>>> like.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That
>>>>>>>>> makes
>>>>>>>>> them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write
>>>>>>>>> clearly!
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Richard Fobes
>>>>>>>>> The VoteFair guy
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>>> > Richard,
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to
>>>>>>>>> improve
>>>>>>>>> >> single-winner score voting.
>>>>>>>>> > It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
>>>>>>>>> > Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it
>>>>>>>>> is an
>>>>>>>>> > attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
>>>>>>>>> > believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
>>>>>>>>> stopping you from
>>>>>>>>> >> > giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>> >> Time and money.
>>>>>>>>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
>>>>>>>>> mass media
>>>>>>>>> > or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just
>>>>>>>>> talking about
>>>>>>>>> > just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion
>>>>>>>>> here.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> >> plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>> >> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you
>>>>>>>>> read my
>>>>>>>>> > previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places
>>>>>>>>> on the
>>>>>>>>> > voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka
>>>>>>>>> FPP).
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
>>>>>>>>> Push-over
>>>>>>>>> > incentive.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
>>>>>>>>> ballot
>>>>>>>>> >> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
>>>>>>>>> that point.
>>>>>>>>> >> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>>>> >> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable
>>>>>>>>> to Push-over
>>>>>>>>> >> > strategy.
>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>> >> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
>>>>>>>>> Gollum,
>>>>>>>>> >> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation
>>>>>>>>> means the
>>>>>>>>> >> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
>>>>>>>>> strict
>>>>>>>>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
>>>>>>>>> relatively benign
>>>>>>>>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
>>>>>>>>> rules. In
>>>>>>>>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>>>>>>>>> > "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
>>>>>>>>> ranking
>>>>>>>>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
>>>>>>>>> It's not
>>>>>>>>> >> a "complex procedure":
>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>>>>> >> When shared preference levels are encountered,
>>>>>>>>> >> // the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
>>>>>>>>> >> // not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
>>>>>>>>> >> // decimal portions. For example, during a
>>>>>>>>> >> // counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
>>>>>>>>> >> // rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
>>>>>>>>> >> // highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
>>>>>>>>> >> // transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
>>>>>>>>> >> // will transfer to candidate 2.
>>>>>>>>> >> //
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
>>>>>>>>> way, this
>>>>>>>>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>>>>> > that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or
>>>>>>>>> someone votes
>>>>>>>>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex
>>>>>>>>> procedure" I
>>>>>>>>> > referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother
>>>>>>>>> describing it.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or
>>>>>>>>> Benham,
>>>>>>>>> > then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than
>>>>>>>>> one
>>>>>>>>> > candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
>>>>>>>>> candidates
>>>>>>>>> > by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
>>>>>>>>> > (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
>>>>>>>>> third
>>>>>>>>> > of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be
>>>>>>>>> fine for
>>>>>>>>> > this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
>>>>>>>>> > eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
>>>>>>>>> strategising
>>>>>>>>> > easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining
>>>>>>>>> candidates)
>>>>>>>>> > ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of
>>>>>>>>> the ones
>>>>>>>>> > they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional
>>>>>>>>> order.
>>>>>>>>> > (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was
>>>>>>>>> higher
>>>>>>>>> > in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but
>>>>>>>>> I think
>>>>>>>>> > you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
>>>>>>>>> above-bottom
>>>>>>>>> > equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think
>>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>> > would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't
>>>>>>>>> > advocate allowing it for those methods.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But
>>>>>>>>> those were
>>>>>>>>> >> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>>>>> >> center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>>>>> > It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods
>>>>>>>>> fail
>>>>>>>>> > IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't
>>>>>>>>> "center-squeeze"
>>>>>>>>> > just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the
>>>>>>>>> precise
>>>>>>>>> > definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of
>>>>>>>>> a car
>>>>>>>>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
>>>>>>>>> on it
>>>>>>>>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>>>>>>>>> recent one.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Chris B.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org
>>>>>>>>> > <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
>>>>>>>>> ?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
>>>>>>>>> 40votefair.org%3E>
>>>>>>>>> > /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
>>>>>>>>> > > ...
>>>>>>>>> > > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
>>>>>>>>> > > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
>>>>>>>>> > single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when
>>>>>>>>> voting is
>>>>>>>>> > not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be
>>>>>>>>> hidden.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
>>>>>>>>> stopping you from
>>>>>>>>> > > giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at
>>>>>>>>> FairVote, and
>>>>>>>>> > academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
>>>>>>>>> > election-method reform.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > >> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way
>>>>>>>>> to avoid it.
>>>>>>>>> > > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater
>>>>>>>>> than with
>>>>>>>>> > > FPP. ...
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> > plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
>>>>>>>>> "overvotes."
>>>>>>>>> > >> RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
>>>>>>>>> > > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
>>>>>>>>> ballot
>>>>>>>>> > > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
>>>>>>>>> that point.
>>>>>>>>> > > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>>>> > > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable
>>>>>>>>> to Push-over
>>>>>>>>> > > strategy.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
>>>>>>>>> Gollum,
>>>>>>>>> > Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation
>>>>>>>>> means the
>>>>>>>>> > evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
>>>>>>>>> It's not
>>>>>>>>> > a "complex procedure":
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm
>>>>>>>>> "buying" by
>>>>>>>>> > >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
>>>>>>>>> > > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
>>>>>>>>> failures, you
>>>>>>>>> > > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the
>>>>>>>>> argument "Let's
>>>>>>>>> > > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
>>>>>>>>> that we can
>>>>>>>>> > > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
>>>>>>>>> > > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by
>>>>>>>>> IRV so that
>>>>>>>>> > > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But
>>>>>>>>> those were
>>>>>>>>> > not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>>>>> > center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about
>>>>>>>>> convoluted
>>>>>>>>> > scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that
>>>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>>>> > really want to understand why I rank some methods better than
>>>>>>>>> others.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Richard Fobes
>>>>>>>>> > The VoteFair guy
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > ----
>>>>>>>>> > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em
>>>>>>>>> for list info
>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>> info
>>>
>>
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