[EM] Fwd: Poll, preliminary ballots

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Fri Apr 26 15:24:55 PDT 2024 

On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 13:43 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:

> EVC=Equal Vote Coalition.
>
> Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable as
>> to be strategically irrelevant.
>
>
Roughly the same could be said for Improved Condorcet failing the
> simple-Condorcet criterion.
>

Improves Condorcet gets rid of that rare failure, but is more complicated
to propose.

>
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 12:01 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> Date: Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:59
>> Subject: Re: [EM] Poll, preliminary ballots
>> To: Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:41 Closed Limelike Curves <
>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Yup, but I prefer "No lesser evils" (and I think EVC does too).
>>>
>>
>> (I accidentally didn’t send my reply to the list)
>>
>> Who is EVC?
>>
>> Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable
>> as to be strategically irrelevant.
>>
>> But the inadequate Condorcet versions fail FBC in a more problematic way.
>> Those versions include margins Condorcet; CW,Plurality; & CW,Top-2-Runoff.
>>
>> WV Condorcet, due to its autodeterence doesn’t have that failure.
>> Green-Armitage found that various hybrids of IRV & Condorcet, as well, are
>> resistant to offensive strategy.
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:33 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:19 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> No favorite betrayal.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You mean FBC, I presume.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:17 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Closed, what is the No Lesser Evils Criterion?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 12:16 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
>>>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions.  Already, with just one
>>>>>>>> oval per
>>>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
>>>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>>>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially if
>>>>>>> you use more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give
>>>>>>> non-overlapping scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a
>>>>>>> digit in base k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with
>>>>>>> options for quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through
>>>>>>> F, with +/- options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique
>>>>>>> scores for up to 18 (!) candidates.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
>>>>>>> outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
>>>>>>> electionmethods at votefair.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>  > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of
>>>>>>>> a car
>>>>>>>>  > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
>>>>>>>> on it
>>>>>>>>  > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>>>>>>>> recent one.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof,
>>>>>>>> doors,
>>>>>>>> etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
>>>>>>>> train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
>>>>>>>> engine, new drive train, etc).  Later we can replace the poorly
>>>>>>>> designed
>>>>>>>> body with a better-looking body.  Then we'll have a well-designed
>>>>>>>> car.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
>>>>>>>> choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy.  IRV's rule of
>>>>>>>> assuming
>>>>>>>> the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least
>>>>>>>> popular is
>>>>>>>> the "body" that isn't well designed.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>  > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
>>>>>>>> strict
>>>>>>>>  > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
>>>>>>>> relatively benign
>>>>>>>>  > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
>>>>>>>> rules. In
>>>>>>>>  > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>>>>>>>>  > "informal".  Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
>>>>>>>> ranking
>>>>>>>>  > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each
>>>>>>>> candidate) in
>>>>>>>> a box.  So you only need one box per candidate.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper
>>>>>>>> ballot.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the
>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions.  Already, with just one
>>>>>>>> oval per
>>>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>>>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two
>>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>>> more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" --
>>>>>>>> stops
>>>>>>>> us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
>>>>>>>> most-disliked
>>>>>>>> candidate.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>  > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
>>>>>>>> way, this
>>>>>>>>  > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>>>>  > that sum to 1.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers
>>>>>>>> work
>>>>>>>> fine.  But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
>>>>>>>> Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>  > But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
>>>>>>>>  > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> nearest smallest integer.  The "almost" refers to a few ballots
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
>>>>>>>> top-ranked candidates.  And it works with four ballots ranking the
>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>> four candidates highest.  Etc.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>  >>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
>>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>>>  >>> from giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>  >> Time and money.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>  > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
>>>>>>>>  > mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed.  I was
>>>>>>>>  > just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
>>>>>>>>  > somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> My time is still a huge limiting factor.  I'm juggling lots of
>>>>>>>> projects.
>>>>>>>>   That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here as
>>>>>>>> I'd
>>>>>>>> like.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written.  That
>>>>>>>> makes
>>>>>>>> them easier to reply to.  Thank you for taking the time to write
>>>>>>>> clearly!
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Richard Fobes
>>>>>>>> The VoteFair guy
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>> > Richard,
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >> Horrible, yes.  Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
>>>>>>>> >> single-winner score voting.
>>>>>>>> > It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
>>>>>>>> > Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it
>>>>>>>> is an
>>>>>>>> > attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
>>>>>>>> > believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
>>>>>>>> you from
>>>>>>>> >>   > giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>> >> Time and money.
>>>>>>>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass
>>>>>>>> media
>>>>>>>> > or to get text books or dictionaries changed.  I was just talking
>>>>>>>> about
>>>>>>>> > just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion
>>>>>>>> here.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >> Our goal is to rise way above plurality.  Accepting limitations
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> >> plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>> >> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you
>>>>>>>> read my
>>>>>>>> > previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> > voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka
>>>>>>>> FPP).
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
>>>>>>>> Push-over
>>>>>>>> > incentive.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
>>>>>>>> ballot
>>>>>>>> >>   > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
>>>>>>>> that point.
>>>>>>>> >>   > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>>> >>   > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable
>>>>>>>> to Push-over
>>>>>>>> >>   > strategy.
>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>> >> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
>>>>>>>> Gollum,
>>>>>>>> >> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates.  Truncation
>>>>>>>> means the
>>>>>>>> >> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
>>>>>>>> strict
>>>>>>>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
>>>>>>>> benign
>>>>>>>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
>>>>>>>> rules. In
>>>>>>>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>>>>>>>> > "informal".  Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
>>>>>>>> ranking
>>>>>>>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
>>>>>>>> It's not
>>>>>>>> >> a "complex procedure":
>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>>>> >>  When shared preference levels are encountered,
>>>>>>>> >> //  the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
>>>>>>>> >> //  not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
>>>>>>>> >> //  decimal portions.  For example, during a
>>>>>>>> >> //  counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
>>>>>>>> >> //  rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
>>>>>>>> >> //  highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
>>>>>>>> >> //  transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
>>>>>>>> >> //  will transfer to candidate 2.
>>>>>>>> >> //
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
>>>>>>>> way, this
>>>>>>>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>>>> > that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or
>>>>>>>> someone votes
>>>>>>>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex
>>>>>>>> procedure" I
>>>>>>>> > referred is the one I, not you, suggest.  I didn't bother
>>>>>>>> describing it.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or
>>>>>>>> Benham,
>>>>>>>> > then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than
>>>>>>>> one
>>>>>>>> > candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
>>>>>>>> candidates
>>>>>>>> > by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
>>>>>>>> > (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
>>>>>>>> third
>>>>>>>> > of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on.  Now it would be
>>>>>>>> fine for
>>>>>>>> > this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
>>>>>>>> > eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
>>>>>>>> strategising
>>>>>>>> > easier.)  Then we count the equal top (among remaining
>>>>>>>> candidates)
>>>>>>>> > ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of
>>>>>>>> the ones
>>>>>>>> > they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional
>>>>>>>> order.
>>>>>>>> > (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was
>>>>>>>> higher
>>>>>>>> > in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
>>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>> > you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
>>>>>>>> above-bottom
>>>>>>>> > equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think
>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>> > would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't
>>>>>>>> > advocate allowing it for those methods.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska.  But
>>>>>>>> those were
>>>>>>>> >> not just Condorcet failures.  They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>>>> >> center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>>>> > It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods
>>>>>>>> fail
>>>>>>>> > IIA, so why are we even mentioning that?  And isn't
>>>>>>>> "center-squeeze"
>>>>>>>> > just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the
>>>>>>>> precise
>>>>>>>> > definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of
>>>>>>>> a car
>>>>>>>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
>>>>>>>> on it
>>>>>>>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>>>>>>>> recent one.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Chris B.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org
>>>>>>>> > <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
>>>>>>>> ?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
>>>>>>>> 40votefair.org%3E>
>>>>>>>> > /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >   > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
>>>>>>>> >   > ...
>>>>>>>> >   > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
>>>>>>>> >   > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Horrible, yes.  Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
>>>>>>>> > single-winner score voting.  It's useful among friends when
>>>>>>>> voting is
>>>>>>>> > not anonymous.  Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >   > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
>>>>>>>> stopping you from
>>>>>>>> >   > giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Time and money.  Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at
>>>>>>>> FairVote, and
>>>>>>>> > academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
>>>>>>>> > election-method reform.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >   >>   Approval voting requires tactical voting.  There's no way
>>>>>>>> to avoid it.
>>>>>>>> >   > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater
>>>>>>>> than with
>>>>>>>> >   > FPP.  ...
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Our goal is to rise way above plurality.  Accepting limitations of
>>>>>>>> > plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >   >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
>>>>>>>> "overvotes."
>>>>>>>> >   >> RCIPE counts them correctly.  ...
>>>>>>>> >   > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
>>>>>>>> ballot
>>>>>>>> >   > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
>>>>>>>> that point.
>>>>>>>> >   > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>>> >   > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
>>>>>>>> Push-over
>>>>>>>> >   > strategy.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
>>>>>>>> Gollum,
>>>>>>>> > Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates.  Truncation means
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> > evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
>>>>>>>> It's not
>>>>>>>> > a "complex procedure":
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >   >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying"
>>>>>>>> by
>>>>>>>> >   >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
>>>>>>>> >   > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
>>>>>>>> failures, you
>>>>>>>> >   > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument
>>>>>>>> "Let's
>>>>>>>> >   > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
>>>>>>>> that we can
>>>>>>>> >   > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
>>>>>>>> >   > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by
>>>>>>>> IRV so that
>>>>>>>> >   > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska.  But those
>>>>>>>> were
>>>>>>>> > not just Condorcet failures.  They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>>>> > center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > I want fewer failures in real elections.  I don't care about
>>>>>>>> convoluted
>>>>>>>> > scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Again, thank you for this useful discussion.  I appreciate that
>>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>>> > really want to understand why I rank some methods better than
>>>>>>>> others.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Richard Fobes
>>>>>>>> > The VoteFair guy
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > ----
>>>>>>>> > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em
>>>>>>>> for list info
>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
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