[EM] Fwd: Poll, preliminary ballots

Closed Limelike Curves closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com
Fri Apr 26 13:42:51 PDT 2024 

EVC=Equal Vote Coalition.

Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable as
> to be strategically irrelevant.

Roughly the same could be said for Improved Condorcet failing the
simple-Condorcet criterion.

On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 12:01 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> Date: Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:59
> Subject: Re: [EM] Poll, preliminary ballots
> To: Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:41 Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Yup, but I prefer "No lesser evils" (and I think EVC does too).
>>
>
> (I accidentally didn’t send my reply to the list)
>
> Who is EVC?
>
> Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable as
> to be strategically irrelevant.
>
> But the inadequate Condorcet versions fail FBC in a more problematic way.
> Those versions include margins Condorcet; CW,Plurality; & CW,Top-2-Runoff.
>
> WV Condorcet, due to its autodeterence doesn’t have that failure.
> Green-Armitage found that various hybrids of IRV & Condorcet, as well, are
> resistant to offensive strategy.
>
>
>
>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:33 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:19 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> No favorite betrayal.
>>>>
>>>
>>> You mean FBC, I presume.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:17 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Closed, what is the No Lesser Evils Criterion?
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 12:16 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
>>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions.  Already, with just one oval
>>>>>>> per
>>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
>>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially if
>>>>>> you use more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give
>>>>>> non-overlapping scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a
>>>>>> digit in base k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with
>>>>>> options for quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through
>>>>>> F, with +/- options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique
>>>>>> scores for up to 18 (!) candidates.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
>>>>>> outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
>>>>>> electionmethods at votefair.org> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>  > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of
>>>>>>> a car
>>>>>>>  > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
>>>>>>> on it
>>>>>>>  > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>>>>>>> recent one.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof,
>>>>>>> doors,
>>>>>>> etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
>>>>>>> train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
>>>>>>> engine, new drive train, etc).  Later we can replace the poorly
>>>>>>> designed
>>>>>>> body with a better-looking body.  Then we'll have a well-designed
>>>>>>> car.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
>>>>>>> choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy.  IRV's rule of
>>>>>>> assuming
>>>>>>> the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least popular
>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>> the "body" that isn't well designed.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>  > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
>>>>>>> strict
>>>>>>>  > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
>>>>>>> benign
>>>>>>>  > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
>>>>>>> rules. In
>>>>>>>  > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>>>>>>>  > "informal".  Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
>>>>>>> ranking
>>>>>>>  > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>> a box.  So you only need one box per candidate.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
>>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions.  Already, with just one oval
>>>>>>> per
>>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
>>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two
>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>> more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" --
>>>>>>> stops
>>>>>>> us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
>>>>>>> most-disliked
>>>>>>> candidate.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>  > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
>>>>>>> way, this
>>>>>>>  > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>>>  > that sum to 1.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers
>>>>>>> work
>>>>>>> fine.  But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
>>>>>>> Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>  > But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
>>>>>>>  > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> nearest smallest integer.  The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
>>>>>>> can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
>>>>>>> top-ranked candidates.  And it works with four ballots ranking the
>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>> four candidates highest.  Etc.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>  >>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>>  >>> from giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>  >> Time and money.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>  > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
>>>>>>>  > mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed.  I was
>>>>>>>  > just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
>>>>>>>  > somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> My time is still a huge limiting factor.  I'm juggling lots of
>>>>>>> projects.
>>>>>>>   That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here as
>>>>>>> I'd
>>>>>>> like.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written.  That makes
>>>>>>> them easier to reply to.  Thank you for taking the time to write
>>>>>>> clearly!
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Richard Fobes
>>>>>>> The VoteFair guy
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>> > Richard,
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >> Horrible, yes.  Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
>>>>>>> >> single-winner score voting.
>>>>>>> > It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
>>>>>>> > Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it
>>>>>>> is an
>>>>>>> > attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
>>>>>>> > believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
>>>>>>> you from
>>>>>>> >>   > giving them names? ...
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> Time and money.
>>>>>>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass
>>>>>>> media
>>>>>>> > or to get text books or dictionaries changed.  I was just talking
>>>>>>> about
>>>>>>> > just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion
>>>>>>> here.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >> Our goal is to rise way above plurality.  Accepting limitations of
>>>>>>> >> plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read
>>>>>>> my
>>>>>>> > previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> > voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka
>>>>>>> FPP).
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
>>>>>>> Push-over
>>>>>>> > incentive.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
>>>>>>> ballot
>>>>>>> >>   > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
>>>>>>> that point.
>>>>>>> >>   > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>> >>   > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
>>>>>>> Push-over
>>>>>>> >>   > strategy.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
>>>>>>> Gollum,
>>>>>>> >> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates.  Truncation means
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> >> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
>>>>>>> strict
>>>>>>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
>>>>>>> benign
>>>>>>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules.
>>>>>>> In
>>>>>>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>>>>>>> > "informal".  Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
>>>>>>> ranking
>>>>>>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
>>>>>>> It's not
>>>>>>> >> a "complex procedure":
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>>> >>  When shared preference levels are encountered,
>>>>>>> >> //  the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
>>>>>>> >> //  not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
>>>>>>> >> //  decimal portions.  For example, during a
>>>>>>> >> //  counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
>>>>>>> >> //  rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
>>>>>>> >> //  highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
>>>>>>> >> //  transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
>>>>>>> >> //  will transfer to candidate 2.
>>>>>>> >> //
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
>>>>>>> way, this
>>>>>>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>>> > that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone
>>>>>>> votes
>>>>>>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex
>>>>>>> procedure" I
>>>>>>> > referred is the one I, not you, suggest.  I didn't bother
>>>>>>> describing it.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or
>>>>>>> Benham,
>>>>>>> > then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
>>>>>>> > candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
>>>>>>> candidates
>>>>>>> > by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
>>>>>>> > (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
>>>>>>> third
>>>>>>> > of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on.  Now it would be
>>>>>>> fine for
>>>>>>> > this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
>>>>>>> > eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
>>>>>>> strategising
>>>>>>> > easier.)  Then we count the equal top (among remaining candidates)
>>>>>>> > ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of
>>>>>>> the ones
>>>>>>> > they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional
>>>>>>> order.
>>>>>>> > (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was
>>>>>>> higher
>>>>>>> > in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>> > you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
>>>>>>> above-bottom
>>>>>>> > equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think
>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>> > would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't
>>>>>>> > advocate allowing it for those methods.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska.  But those
>>>>>>> were
>>>>>>> >> not just Condorcet failures.  They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>>> >> center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>>> > It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods
>>>>>>> fail
>>>>>>> > IIA, so why are we even mentioning that?  And isn't
>>>>>>> "center-squeeze"
>>>>>>> > just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the
>>>>>>> precise
>>>>>>> > definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a
>>>>>>> car
>>>>>>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on
>>>>>>> it
>>>>>>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>>>>>>> recent one.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Chris B.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org
>>>>>>> > <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
>>>>>>> ?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
>>>>>>> 40votefair.org%3E>
>>>>>>> > /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >   > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
>>>>>>> >   > ...
>>>>>>> >   > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
>>>>>>> >   > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Horrible, yes.  Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
>>>>>>> > single-winner score voting.  It's useful among friends when voting
>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>> > not anonymous.  Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >   > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
>>>>>>> you from
>>>>>>> >   > giving them names? ...
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Time and money.  Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote,
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> > academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
>>>>>>> > election-method reform.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >   >>   Approval voting requires tactical voting.  There's no way
>>>>>>> to avoid it.
>>>>>>> >   > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than
>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>> >   > FPP.  ...
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Our goal is to rise way above plurality.  Accepting limitations of
>>>>>>> > plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >   >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
>>>>>>> "overvotes."
>>>>>>> >   >> RCIPE counts them correctly.  ...
>>>>>>> >   > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
>>>>>>> ballot
>>>>>>> >   > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
>>>>>>> that point.
>>>>>>> >   > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>> >   > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
>>>>>>> Push-over
>>>>>>> >   > strategy.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
>>>>>>> Gollum,
>>>>>>> > Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates.  Truncation means
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> > evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
>>>>>>> It's not
>>>>>>> > a "complex procedure":
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >   >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying"
>>>>>>> by
>>>>>>> >   >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
>>>>>>> >   > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
>>>>>>> failures, you
>>>>>>> >   > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument
>>>>>>> "Let's
>>>>>>> >   > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
>>>>>>> that we can
>>>>>>> >   > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
>>>>>>> >   > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV
>>>>>>> so that
>>>>>>> >   > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska.  But those
>>>>>>> were
>>>>>>> > not just Condorcet failures.  They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>>> > center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > I want fewer failures in real elections.  I don't care about
>>>>>>> convoluted
>>>>>>> > scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Again, thank you for this useful discussion.  I appreciate that you
>>>>>>> > really want to understand why I rank some methods better than
>>>>>>> others.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Richard Fobes
>>>>>>> > The VoteFair guy
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > ----
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>>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> ----
>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
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>>>>>>
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