[EM] Fwd: Poll, preliminary ballots

[Michael Ossipoff]

Meeting FBC means you never have incentive or need to bury your favorite.
It doesn’t mean that there are no lesser evils. Evils are still evil’s, &
some are still lesser than others.

A voter who thinks that he has to support a lesser evil still can & will
with an FBC-complying method. He just won’t need to bury his favorite under
it.

Approval has the voter-median as its Myerson-Weber equilibrium.  & so,
hopefully lesser evils voters would soon stop being one.

On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 22:10 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
>
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 16:13 Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I agree; you can simplify it by just taking "beats" to mean
>> "majority-beats" and then describing the Smith set. I think this *might*
>> restore later-no-help as well, if you use Majority-Smith//Score? It might
>> even satisfy all of Generalized Strategy-Free, No Lesser Evils, minimal
>> defense, and later-no-help.
>>
>
> Write definition & rules for it, & test it for those compliances. If it
> does all that, plus the Condorcet Criterion that’s pretty good. …if No
> Lesser Evils means FBC.
>
> BTW, It would be a good idea to always tell people that, by “No Lesser
> Evils”, you mean FBC.
>
>
>
>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 3:25 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 13:43 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> EVC=Equal Vote Coalition.
>>>>
>>>> Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable
>>>>> as to be strategically irrelevant.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Roughly the same could be said for Improved Condorcet failing the
>>>> simple-Condorcet criterion.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Improves Condorcet gets rid of that rare failure, but is more
>>> complicated to propose.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 12:01 PM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
>>>>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>>>> Date: Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:59
>>>>> Subject: Re: [EM] Poll, preliminary ballots
>>>>> To: Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:41 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Yup, but I prefer "No lesser evils" (and I think EVC does too).
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> (I accidentally didn’t send my reply to the list)
>>>>>
>>>>> Who is EVC?
>>>>>
>>>>> Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare &
>>>>> unpredictable as to be strategically irrelevant.
>>>>>
>>>>> But the inadequate Condorcet versions fail FBC in a more
>>>>> problematic way. Those versions include margins Condorcet; CW,Plurality; &
>>>>> CW,Top-2-Runoff.
>>>>>
>>>>> WV Condorcet, due to its autodeterence doesn’t have that failure.
>>>>> Green-Armitage found that various hybrids of IRV & Condorcet, as well, are
>>>>> resistant to offensive strategy.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:33 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:19 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> No favorite betrayal.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You mean FBC, I presume.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:17 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Closed, what is the No Lesser Evils Criterion?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 12:16 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper
>>>>>>>>>>> ballot.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the
>>>>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions.  Already, with just one
>>>>>>>>>>> oval per
>>>>>>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as
>>>>>>>>>>> many
>>>>>>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially
>>>>>>>>>> if you use more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give
>>>>>>>>>> non-overlapping scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a
>>>>>>>>>> digit in base k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with
>>>>>>>>>> options for quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through
>>>>>>>>>> F, with +/- options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique
>>>>>>>>>> scores for up to 18 (!) candidates.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> (Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
>>>>>>>>>> outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
>>>>>>>>>> electionmethods at votefair.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>  > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer
>>>>>>>>>>> of a car
>>>>>>>>>>>  > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another
>>>>>>>>>>> kludge on it
>>>>>>>>>>>  > designed to only guard against another crash just like the
>>>>>>>>>>> most
>>>>>>>>>>> recent one.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof,
>>>>>>>>>>> doors,
>>>>>>>>>>> etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine,
>>>>>>>>>>> drive
>>>>>>>>>>> train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes,
>>>>>>>>>>> new
>>>>>>>>>>> engine, new drive train, etc).  Later we can replace the poorly
>>>>>>>>>>> designed
>>>>>>>>>>> body with a better-looking body.  Then we'll have a
>>>>>>>>>>> well-designed car.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using
>>>>>>>>>>> ranked
>>>>>>>>>>> choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy.  IRV's rule of
>>>>>>>>>>> assuming
>>>>>>>>>>> the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least
>>>>>>>>>>> popular is
>>>>>>>>>>> the "body" that isn't well designed.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>  > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing
>>>>>>>>>>> unlimited strict
>>>>>>>>>>>  > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
>>>>>>>>>>> relatively benign
>>>>>>>>>>>  > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
>>>>>>>>>>> rules. In
>>>>>>>>>>>  > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned
>>>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>>>>  > "informal".  Normally there should be nothing stopping you
>>>>>>>>>>> from ranking
>>>>>>>>>>>  > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each
>>>>>>>>>>> candidate) in
>>>>>>>>>>> a box.  So you only need one box per candidate.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper
>>>>>>>>>>> ballot.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the
>>>>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions.  Already, with just one
>>>>>>>>>>> oval per
>>>>>>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as
>>>>>>>>>>> many
>>>>>>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting
>>>>>>>>>>> two or
>>>>>>>>>>> more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" --
>>>>>>>>>>> stops
>>>>>>>>>>> us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
>>>>>>>>>>> most-disliked
>>>>>>>>>>> candidate.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>  > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in
>>>>>>>>>>> this way, this
>>>>>>>>>>>  > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>>>>>>>  > that sum to 1.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal
>>>>>>>>>>> numbers work
>>>>>>>>>>> fine.  But few voters, and very few politicians, understand
>>>>>>>>>>> math.
>>>>>>>>>>> Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>  > But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
>>>>>>>>>>>  > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers
>>>>>>>>>>> to the
>>>>>>>>>>> nearest smallest integer.  The "almost" refers to a few ballots
>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>> can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
>>>>>>>>>>> top-ranked candidates.  And it works with four ballots ranking
>>>>>>>>>>> the same
>>>>>>>>>>> four candidates highest.  Etc.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>  >>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
>>>>>>>>>>> stopping you
>>>>>>>>>>>  >>> from giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>  >> Time and money.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>  > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
>>>>>>>>>>>  > mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed.  I
>>>>>>>>>>> was
>>>>>>>>>>>  > just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
>>>>>>>>>>>  > somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> My time is still a huge limiting factor.  I'm juggling lots of
>>>>>>>>>>> projects.
>>>>>>>>>>>   That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here
>>>>>>>>>>> as I'd
>>>>>>>>>>> like.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written.  That
>>>>>>>>>>> makes
>>>>>>>>>>> them easier to reply to.  Thank you for taking the time to write
>>>>>>>>>>> clearly!
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Richard Fobes
>>>>>>>>>>> The VoteFair guy
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> > Richard,
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> >> Horrible, yes.  Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to
>>>>>>>>>>> improve
>>>>>>>>>>> >> single-winner score voting.
>>>>>>>>>>> > It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal
>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>> > Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If
>>>>>>>>>>> it is an
>>>>>>>>>>> > attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great
>>>>>>>>>>> difficulty
>>>>>>>>>>> > believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> >> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
>>>>>>>>>>> stopping you from
>>>>>>>>>>> >>   > giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>>> >> Time and money.
>>>>>>>>>>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
>>>>>>>>>>> mass media
>>>>>>>>>>> > or to get text books or dictionaries changed.  I was just
>>>>>>>>>>> talking about
>>>>>>>>>>> > just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous)
>>>>>>>>>>> discussion here.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> >> Our goal is to rise way above plurality.  Accepting
>>>>>>>>>>> limitations of
>>>>>>>>>>> >> plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>>> >> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you
>>>>>>>>>>> read my
>>>>>>>>>>> > previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places
>>>>>>>>>>> on the
>>>>>>>>>>> > voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka
>>>>>>>>>>> FPP).
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
>>>>>>>>>>> Push-over
>>>>>>>>>>> > incentive.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> >> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
>>>>>>>>>>> ballot
>>>>>>>>>>> >>   > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated
>>>>>>>>>>> at that point.
>>>>>>>>>>> >>   > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>>>>>> >>   > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more
>>>>>>>>>>> vulnerable to Push-over
>>>>>>>>>>> >>   > strategy.
>>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>>> >> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate
>>>>>>>>>>> -- Gollum,
>>>>>>>>>>> >> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates.  Truncation
>>>>>>>>>>> means the
>>>>>>>>>>> >> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing
>>>>>>>>>>> unlimited strict
>>>>>>>>>>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
>>>>>>>>>>> relatively benign
>>>>>>>>>>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot
>>>>>>>>>>> rules. In
>>>>>>>>>>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned
>>>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>>>> > "informal".  Normally there should be nothing stopping you
>>>>>>>>>>> from ranking
>>>>>>>>>>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> >> I've written code that correctly counts so-called
>>>>>>>>>>> "overvotes."  It's not
>>>>>>>>>>> >> a "complex procedure":
>>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>>>>>>> >>  When shared preference levels are encountered,
>>>>>>>>>>> >> //  the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
>>>>>>>>>>> >> //  not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
>>>>>>>>>>> >> //  decimal portions.  For example, during a
>>>>>>>>>>> >> //  counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
>>>>>>>>>>> >> //  rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
>>>>>>>>>>> >> //  highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
>>>>>>>>>>> >> //  transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
>>>>>>>>>>> >> //  will transfer to candidate 2.
>>>>>>>>>>> >> //
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
>>>>>>>>>>> way, this
>>>>>>>>>>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>>>>>>> > that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or
>>>>>>>>>>> someone votes
>>>>>>>>>>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex
>>>>>>>>>>> procedure" I
>>>>>>>>>>> > referred is the one I, not you, suggest.  I didn't bother
>>>>>>>>>>> describing it.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or
>>>>>>>>>>> Benham,
>>>>>>>>>>> > then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than
>>>>>>>>>>> one
>>>>>>>>>>> > candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
>>>>>>>>>>> candidates
>>>>>>>>>>> > by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
>>>>>>>>>>> > (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as
>>>>>>>>>>> a third
>>>>>>>>>>> > of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on.  Now it would
>>>>>>>>>>> be fine for
>>>>>>>>>>> > this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to
>>>>>>>>>>> next
>>>>>>>>>>> > eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
>>>>>>>>>>> strategising
>>>>>>>>>>> > easier.)  Then we count the equal top (among remaining
>>>>>>>>>>> candidates)
>>>>>>>>>>> > ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever
>>>>>>>>>>> of the ones
>>>>>>>>>>> > they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional
>>>>>>>>>>> order.
>>>>>>>>>>> > (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B
>>>>>>>>>>> was higher
>>>>>>>>>>> > in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote
>>>>>>>>>>> but I think
>>>>>>>>>>> > you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
>>>>>>>>>>> above-bottom
>>>>>>>>>>> > equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think
>>>>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>>>> > would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I
>>>>>>>>>>> don't
>>>>>>>>>>> > advocate allowing it for those methods.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> >> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska.  But
>>>>>>>>>>> those were
>>>>>>>>>>> >> not just Condorcet failures.  They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>>>>>>> >> center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>>>>>>> > It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable
>>>>>>>>>>> methods fail
>>>>>>>>>>> > IIA, so why are we even mentioning that?  And isn't
>>>>>>>>>>> "center-squeeze"
>>>>>>>>>>> > just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the
>>>>>>>>>>> precise
>>>>>>>>>>> > definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer
>>>>>>>>>>> of a car
>>>>>>>>>>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another
>>>>>>>>>>> kludge on it
>>>>>>>>>>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the
>>>>>>>>>>> most recent one.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > Chris B.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org
>>>>>>>>>>> > <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
>>>>>>>>>>> ?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
>>>>>>>>>>> 40votefair.org%3E>
>>>>>>>>>>> > /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> >   > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
>>>>>>>>>>> >   > ...
>>>>>>>>>>> >   > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
>>>>>>>>>>> >   > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > Horrible, yes.  Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to
>>>>>>>>>>> improve
>>>>>>>>>>> > single-winner score voting.  It's useful among friends when
>>>>>>>>>>> voting is
>>>>>>>>>>> > not anonymous.  Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be
>>>>>>>>>>> hidden.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> >   > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's
>>>>>>>>>>> stopping you from
>>>>>>>>>>> >   > giving them names? ...
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > Time and money.  Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at
>>>>>>>>>>> FairVote, and
>>>>>>>>>>> > academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
>>>>>>>>>>> > election-method reform.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> >   >>   Approval voting requires tactical voting.  There's no
>>>>>>>>>>> way to avoid it.
>>>>>>>>>>> >   > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater
>>>>>>>>>>> than with
>>>>>>>>>>> >   > FPP.  ...
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > Our goal is to rise way above plurality.  Accepting
>>>>>>>>>>> limitations of
>>>>>>>>>>> > plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> >   >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
>>>>>>>>>>> "overvotes."
>>>>>>>>>>> >   >> RCIPE counts them correctly.  ...
>>>>>>>>>>> >   > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against
>>>>>>>>>>> the ballot
>>>>>>>>>>> >   > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
>>>>>>>>>>> that point.
>>>>>>>>>>> >   > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>>>>>> >   > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable
>>>>>>>>>>> to Push-over
>>>>>>>>>>> >   > strategy.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
>>>>>>>>>>> Gollum,
>>>>>>>>>>> > Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates.  Truncation
>>>>>>>>>>> means the
>>>>>>>>>>> > evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > I've written code that correctly counts so-called
>>>>>>>>>>> "overvotes."  It's not
>>>>>>>>>>> > a "complex procedure":
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> >   >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm
>>>>>>>>>>> "buying" by
>>>>>>>>>>> >   >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
>>>>>>>>>>> >   > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
>>>>>>>>>>> failures, you
>>>>>>>>>>> >   > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the
>>>>>>>>>>> argument "Let's
>>>>>>>>>>> >   > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
>>>>>>>>>>> that we can
>>>>>>>>>>> >   > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
>>>>>>>>>>> >   > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by
>>>>>>>>>>> IRV so that
>>>>>>>>>>> >   > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska.  But
>>>>>>>>>>> those were
>>>>>>>>>>> > not just Condorcet failures.  They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>>>>>>> > center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > I want fewer failures in real elections.  I don't care about
>>>>>>>>>>> convoluted
>>>>>>>>>>> > scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > Again, thank you for this useful discussion.  I appreciate
>>>>>>>>>>> that you
>>>>>>>>>>> > really want to understand why I rank some methods better than
>>>>>>>>>>> others.
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > Richard Fobes
>>>>>>>>>>> > The VoteFair guy
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>> > ----
>>>>>>>>>>> > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em
>>>>>>>>>>> for list info
>>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em
>>>>>>>>>>> for list info
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em
>>>>>>>>>> for list info
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>> list info
>>>>>
>>>>
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