[EM] Poll, preliminary ballots

Closed Limelike Curves closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com
Fri Apr 26 11:19:25 PDT 2024 

No favorite betrayal.

On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:17 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Closed, what is the No Lesser Evils Criterion?
>
> On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 12:16 Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>>
>>
>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions.  Already, with just one oval per
>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>
>>
>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>
>>
>> Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially if you
>> use more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give non-overlapping
>> scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a digit in base
>> k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with options for
>> quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through F, with +/-
>> options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique scores for up
>> to 18 (!) candidates.
>>
>> (Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
>> outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
>>
>> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
>> electionmethods at votefair.org> wrote:
>>
>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>
>>>  > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
>>>  > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
>>>  > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>>> recent one.
>>>
>>> Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof, doors,
>>> etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
>>> train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
>>> engine, new drive train, etc).  Later we can replace the poorly designed
>>> body with a better-looking body.  Then we'll have a well-designed car.
>>>
>>> To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
>>> choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy.  IRV's rule of assuming
>>> the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least popular is
>>> the "body" that isn't well designed.
>>>
>>>
>>>  > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
>>> strict
>>>  > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
>>> benign
>>>  > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
>>>  > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>>>  > "informal".  Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
>>> ranking
>>>  > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>
>>> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate) in
>>> a box.  So you only need one box per candidate.
>>>
>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>>>
>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions.  Already, with just one oval per
>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>
>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>
>>> This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two or
>>> more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" -- stops
>>> us from being able to rank all other candidates above our most-disliked
>>> candidate.
>>>
>>>
>>>  > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
>>> this
>>>  > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
>>>  > that sum to 1.
>>>
>>> Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers work
>>> fine.  But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
>>> Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
>>>
>>>  > But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
>>>  > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>
>>> That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to the
>>> nearest smallest integer.  The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
>>> can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
>>>
>>> That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
>>> top-ranked candidates.  And it works with four ballots ranking the same
>>> four candidates highest.  Etc.
>>>
>>>
>>>  >>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
>>>  >>> from giving them names? ...
>>>
>>>  >> Time and money.
>>>
>>>  > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
>>>  > mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed.  I was
>>>  > just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
>>>  > somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
>>>
>>> My time is still a huge limiting factor.  I'm juggling lots of projects.
>>>   That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here as I'd
>>> like.
>>>
>>>
>>> Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written.  That makes
>>> them easier to reply to.  Thank you for taking the time to write clearly!
>>>
>>> Richard Fobes
>>> The VoteFair guy
>>>
>>>
>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>> > Richard,
>>> >
>>> >> Horrible, yes.  Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
>>> >> single-winner score voting.
>>> > It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
>>> > Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is an
>>> > attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
>>> > believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
>>> >
>>> >> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
>>> from
>>> >>   > giving them names? ...
>>> >>
>>> >> Time and money.
>>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass
>>> media
>>> > or to get text books or dictionaries changed.  I was just talking
>>> about
>>> > just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
>>> >
>>> >> Our goal is to rise way above plurality.  Accepting limitations of
>>> >> plurality is unnecessary.
>>> >>
>>> >> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>> >
>>> > I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read my
>>> > previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on the
>>> > voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
>>> >
>>> > Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
>>> Push-over
>>> > incentive.
>>> >
>>> >> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
>>> >>   > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
>>> point.
>>> >>   > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
>>> >>   > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
>>> Push-over
>>> >>   > strategy.
>>> >>
>>> >> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
>>> >> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates.  Truncation means the
>>> >> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>> >>
>>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
>>> strict
>>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
>>> benign
>>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
>>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>>> > "informal".  Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
>>> ranking
>>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>> >
>>> >> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."  It's
>>> not
>>> >> a "complex procedure":
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>> >>  When shared preference levels are encountered,
>>> >> //  the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
>>> >> //  not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
>>> >> //  decimal portions.  For example, during a
>>> >> //  counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
>>> >> //  rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
>>> >> //  highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
>>> >> //  transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
>>> >> //  will transfer to candidate 2.
>>> >> //
>>> >
>>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
>>> this
>>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
>>> > that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone
>>> votes
>>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>> >
>>> > I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex procedure"
>>> I
>>> > referred is the one I, not you, suggest.  I didn't bother describing
>>> it.
>>> >
>>> > I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or Benham,
>>> > then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
>>> > candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the candidates
>>> > by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
>>> > (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a third
>>> > of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on.  Now it would be fine
>>> for
>>> > this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
>>> > eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
>>> strategising
>>> > easier.)  Then we count the equal top (among remaining candidates)
>>> > ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of the
>>> ones
>>> > they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional order.
>>> > (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was
>>> higher
>>> > in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
>>> >
>>> > This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
>>> think
>>> > you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing above-bottom
>>> > equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think there
>>> > would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't
>>> > advocate allowing it for those methods.
>>> >
>>> >> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska.  But those were
>>> >> not just Condorcet failures.  They also were IIA failures,
>>> >> center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>> > It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods fail
>>> > IIA, so why are we even mentioning that?  And isn't "center-squeeze"
>>> > just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the precise
>>> > definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
>>> >
>>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
>>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
>>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most recent
>>> one.
>>> >
>>> > Chris B.
>>> >
>>> > *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org
>>> > <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
>>> ?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
>>> 40votefair.org%3E>
>>> > /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> >
>>> > On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>> >
>>> >   > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
>>> >   > ...
>>> >   > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
>>> >   > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
>>> >
>>> > Horrible, yes.  Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
>>> > single-winner score voting.  It's useful among friends when voting is
>>> > not anonymous.  Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
>>> >
>>> >   > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
>>> from
>>> >   > giving them names? ...
>>> >
>>> > Time and money.  Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote, and
>>> > academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
>>> > election-method reform.
>>> >
>>> >   >>   Approval voting requires tactical voting.  There's no way to
>>> avoid it.
>>> >   > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than with
>>> >   > FPP.  ...
>>> >
>>> > Our goal is to rise way above plurality.  Accepting limitations of
>>> > plurality is unnecessary.
>>> >
>>> > Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>> >
>>> >   >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
>>> "overvotes."
>>> >   >> RCIPE counts them correctly.  ...
>>> >   > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
>>> >   > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
>>> point.
>>> >   > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
>>> >   > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
>>> Push-over
>>> >   > strategy.
>>> >
>>> > I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
>>> > Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates.  Truncation means the
>>> > evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>> >
>>> > I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."  It's
>>> not
>>> > a "complex procedure":
>>> >
>>> >
>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>> >
>>> >   >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
>>> >   >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
>>> >   > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet failures,
>>> you
>>> >   > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument
>>> "Let's
>>> >   > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that we
>>> can
>>> >   > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
>>> >   > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
>>> that
>>> >   > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
>>> >
>>> > I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska.  But those were
>>> > not just Condorcet failures.  They also were IIA failures,
>>> > center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>> >
>>> > I want fewer failures in real elections.  I don't care about convoluted
>>> > scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
>>> >
>>> > Again, thank you for this useful discussion.  I appreciate that you
>>> > really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.
>>> >
>>> > Richard Fobes
>>> > The VoteFair guy
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > ----
>>> > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>> list info
>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>> info
>>>
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
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>>
>
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