[EM] Fwd: Poll, preliminary ballots

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Fri Apr 26 11:59:54 PDT 2024 

---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
Date: Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:59
Subject: Re: [EM] Poll, preliminary ballots
To: Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com>




On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:41 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:

> Yup, but I prefer "No lesser evils" (and I think EVC does too).
>

(I accidentally didn’t send my reply to the list)

Who is EVC?

Condorcet fails FBC, but the general failure is so rare & unpredictable as
to be strategically irrelevant.

But the inadequate Condorcet versions fail FBC in a more problematic way.
Those versions include margins Condorcet; CW,Plurality; & CW,Top-2-Runoff.

WV Condorcet, due to its autodeterence doesn’t have that failure.
Green-Armitage found that various hybrids of IRV & Condorcet, as well, are
resistant to offensive strategy.



> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:33 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:19 Closed Limelike Curves <
>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> No favorite betrayal.
>>>
>>
>> You mean FBC, I presume.
>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:17 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Closed, what is the No Lesser Evils Criterion?
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 12:16 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions.  Already, with just one oval
>>>>>> per
>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially if you
>>>>> use more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give non-overlapping
>>>>> scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a digit in base
>>>>> k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with options for
>>>>> quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through F, with +/-
>>>>> options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique scores for up
>>>>> to 18 (!) candidates.
>>>>>
>>>>> (Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can
>>>>> outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
>>>>> electionmethods at votefair.org> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a
>>>>>> car
>>>>>>  > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on
>>>>>> it
>>>>>>  > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>>>>>> recent one.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof, doors,
>>>>>> etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
>>>>>> train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
>>>>>> engine, new drive train, etc).  Later we can replace the poorly
>>>>>> designed
>>>>>> body with a better-looking body.  Then we'll have a well-designed car.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
>>>>>> choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy.  IRV's rule of
>>>>>> assuming
>>>>>> the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least popular
>>>>>> is
>>>>>> the "body" that isn't well designed.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
>>>>>> strict
>>>>>>  > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
>>>>>> benign
>>>>>>  > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules.
>>>>>> In
>>>>>>  > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>>>>>>  > "informal".  Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
>>>>>> ranking
>>>>>>  > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
>>>>>> in
>>>>>> a box.  So you only need one box per candidate.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
>>>>>> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions.  Already, with just one oval
>>>>>> per
>>>>>> candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and
>>>>>> sometimes there are two ballot pages.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
>>>>>> choice columns as candidates.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two or
>>>>>> more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" --
>>>>>> stops
>>>>>> us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
>>>>>> most-disliked
>>>>>> candidate.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this
>>>>>> way, this
>>>>>>  > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>>  > that sum to 1.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers
>>>>>> work
>>>>>> fine.  But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
>>>>>> Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  > But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
>>>>>>  > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to the
>>>>>> nearest smallest integer.  The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
>>>>>> can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
>>>>>> top-ranked candidates.  And it works with four ballots ranking the
>>>>>> same
>>>>>> four candidates highest.  Etc.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  >>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
>>>>>> you
>>>>>>  >>> from giving them names? ...
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  >> Time and money.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
>>>>>>  > mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed.  I was
>>>>>>  > just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
>>>>>>  > somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> My time is still a huge limiting factor.  I'm juggling lots of
>>>>>> projects.
>>>>>>   That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here as
>>>>>> I'd
>>>>>> like.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written.  That makes
>>>>>> them easier to reply to.  Thank you for taking the time to write
>>>>>> clearly!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Richard Fobes
>>>>>> The VoteFair guy
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>> > Richard,
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >> Horrible, yes.  Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
>>>>>> >> single-winner score voting.
>>>>>> > It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
>>>>>> > Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is
>>>>>> an
>>>>>> > attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
>>>>>> > believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
>>>>>> you from
>>>>>> >>   > giving them names? ...
>>>>>> >>
>>>>>> >> Time and money.
>>>>>> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass
>>>>>> media
>>>>>> > or to get text books or dictionaries changed.  I was just talking
>>>>>> about
>>>>>> > just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion
>>>>>> here.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >> Our goal is to rise way above plurality.  Accepting limitations of
>>>>>> >> plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>> >>
>>>>>> >> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read
>>>>>> my
>>>>>> > previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> > voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
>>>>>> Push-over
>>>>>> > incentive.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
>>>>>> ballot
>>>>>> >>   > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at
>>>>>> that point.
>>>>>> >>   > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>> complex
>>>>>> >>   > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
>>>>>> Push-over
>>>>>> >>   > strategy.
>>>>>> >>
>>>>>> >> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
>>>>>> Gollum,
>>>>>> >> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates.  Truncation means
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> >> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>> >>
>>>>>> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
>>>>>> strict
>>>>>> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
>>>>>> benign
>>>>>> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules.
>>>>>> In
>>>>>> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
>>>>>> > "informal".  Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
>>>>>> ranking
>>>>>> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
>>>>>> It's not
>>>>>> >> a "complex procedure":
>>>>>> >>
>>>>>> >>
>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>> >>  When shared preference levels are encountered,
>>>>>> >> //  the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
>>>>>> >> //  not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
>>>>>> >> //  decimal portions.  For example, during a
>>>>>> >> //  counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
>>>>>> >> //  rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
>>>>>> >> //  highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
>>>>>> >> //  transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
>>>>>> >> //  will transfer to candidate 2.
>>>>>> >> //
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
>>>>>> this
>>>>>> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
>>>>>> fractions
>>>>>> > that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone
>>>>>> votes
>>>>>> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex
>>>>>> procedure" I
>>>>>> > referred is the one I, not you, suggest.  I didn't bother
>>>>>> describing it.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or
>>>>>> Benham,
>>>>>> > then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
>>>>>> > candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
>>>>>> candidates
>>>>>> > by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
>>>>>> > (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
>>>>>> third
>>>>>> > of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on.  Now it would be
>>>>>> fine for
>>>>>> > this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next
>>>>>> > eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
>>>>>> strategising
>>>>>> > easier.)  Then we count the equal top (among remaining candidates)
>>>>>> > ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of the
>>>>>> ones
>>>>>> > they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional
>>>>>> order.
>>>>>> > (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was
>>>>>> higher
>>>>>> > in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
>>>>>> think
>>>>>> > you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
>>>>>> above-bottom
>>>>>> > equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think
>>>>>> there
>>>>>> > would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't
>>>>>> > advocate allowing it for those methods.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska.  But those
>>>>>> were
>>>>>> >> not just Condorcet failures.  They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>> >> center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>> > It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods
>>>>>> fail
>>>>>> > IIA, so why are we even mentioning that?  And isn't
>>>>>> "center-squeeze"
>>>>>> > just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the
>>>>>> precise
>>>>>> > definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a
>>>>>> car
>>>>>> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on
>>>>>> it
>>>>>> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
>>>>>> recent one.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Chris B.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org
>>>>>> > <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
>>>>>> ?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
>>>>>> 40votefair.org%3E>
>>>>>> > /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >   > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
>>>>>> >   > ...
>>>>>> >   > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
>>>>>> >   > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Horrible, yes.  Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
>>>>>> > single-winner score voting.  It's useful among friends when voting
>>>>>> is
>>>>>> > not anonymous.  Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >   > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
>>>>>> you from
>>>>>> >   > giving them names? ...
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Time and money.  Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote,
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> > academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
>>>>>> > election-method reform.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >   >>   Approval voting requires tactical voting.  There's no way to
>>>>>> avoid it.
>>>>>> >   > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than
>>>>>> with
>>>>>> >   > FPP.  ...
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Our goal is to rise way above plurality.  Accepting limitations of
>>>>>> > plurality is unnecessary.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >   >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
>>>>>> "overvotes."
>>>>>> >   >> RCIPE counts them correctly.  ...
>>>>>> >   > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
>>>>>> ballot
>>>>>> >   > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
>>>>>> point.
>>>>>> >   > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite
>>>>>> complex
>>>>>> >   > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
>>>>>> Push-over
>>>>>> >   > strategy.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
>>>>>> Gollum,
>>>>>> > Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates.  Truncation means
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> > evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."
>>>>>> It's not
>>>>>> > a "complex procedure":
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >   >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
>>>>>> >   >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
>>>>>> >   > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
>>>>>> failures, you
>>>>>> >   > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument
>>>>>> "Let's
>>>>>> >   > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that
>>>>>> we can
>>>>>> >   > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
>>>>>> >   > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV
>>>>>> so that
>>>>>> >   > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska.  But those
>>>>>> were
>>>>>> > not just Condorcet failures.  They also were IIA failures,
>>>>>> > center-squeeze failures, etc.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > I want fewer failures in real elections.  I don't care about
>>>>>> convoluted
>>>>>> > scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Again, thank you for this useful discussion.  I appreciate that you
>>>>>> > really want to understand why I rank some methods better than
>>>>>> others.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Richard Fobes
>>>>>> > The VoteFair guy
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > ----
>>>>>> > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>> list info
>>>>>> ----
>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>
>>>>> ----
>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>> list info
>>>>>
>>>>
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