<div dir="ltr">No favorite betrayal.</div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 11:17 AM Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com">email9648742@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto">Closed, what is the No Lesser Evils Criterion?</div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 12:16 Closed Limelike Curves <<a href="mailto:closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com" target="_blank">closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.</blockquote><div dir="ltr"><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper<br>ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval per<br>candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and<br>sometimes there are two ballot pages.</blockquote><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many<br>choice columns as candidates.</blockquote><br></div></div><div>Worth noting that's not an issue with rated ballots, especially if you use more clever arrangements. k^2 ovals is enough to give non-overlapping scores to k^k candidates, by having each bubble represent a digit in base k. In practice I'd stick to something like 1-5 stars, with options for quarter-stars +.25, +.5, +.75; or alternatively use A through F, with +/- options. This gives voters the opportunity to assign unique scores for up to 18 (!) candidates.</div><div><br></div><div>(Rated ballots also open up cardinal-Condorcet hybrids, which can outperform ordinal-Condorcet at resolving cycles as Green-Armytage showed.)</div></div><div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 11:34 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <<a href="mailto:electionmethods@votefair.org" target="_blank">electionmethods@votefair.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:<br>
<br>
> Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car<br>
> or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it<br>
> designed to only guard against another crash just like the most <br>
recent one.<br>
<br>
Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof, doors, <br>
etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive <br>
train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new <br>
engine, new drive train, etc). Later we can replace the poorly designed <br>
body with a better-looking body. Then we'll have a well-designed car.<br>
<br>
To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked <br>
choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy. IRV's rule of assuming <br>
the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least popular is <br>
the "body" that isn't well designed.<br>
<br>
<br>
> For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited strict<br>
> ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively benign<br>
> way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In<br>
> Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as<br>
> "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from ranking<br>
> the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.<br>
<br>
In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate) in <br>
a box. So you only need one box per candidate.<br>
<br>
Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.<br>
<br>
Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper <br>
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions. Already, with just one oval per <br>
candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and <br>
sometimes there are two ballot pages.<br>
<br>
As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many <br>
choice columns as candidates.<br>
<br>
This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two or <br>
more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" -- stops <br>
us from being able to rank all other candidates above our most-disliked <br>
candidate.<br>
<br>
<br>
> Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way, this<br>
> seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions<br>
> that sum to 1.<br>
<br>
Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers work <br>
fine. But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math. <br>
Especially fractions and decimal numbers.<br>
<br>
> But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes<br>
> more than two candidates at the same ranking level?<br>
<br>
That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to the <br>
nearest smallest integer. The "almost" refers to a few ballots that <br>
can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.<br>
<br>
That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three <br>
top-ranked candidates. And it works with four ballots ranking the same <br>
four candidates highest. Etc.<br>
<br>
<br>
>>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you<br>
>>> from giving them names? ...<br>
<br>
>> Time and money.<br>
<br>
> I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the<br>
> mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was<br>
> just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully<br>
> somewhat rigorous) discussion here.<br>
<br>
My time is still a huge limiting factor. I'm juggling lots of projects. <br>
That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here as I'd <br>
like.<br>
<br>
<br>
Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written. That makes <br>
them easier to reply to. Thank you for taking the time to write clearly!<br>
<br>
Richard Fobes<br>
The VoteFair guy<br>
<br>
<br>
On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:<br>
> Richard,<br>
> <br>
>> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve<br>
>> single-winner score voting.<br>
> It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and <br>
> Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is an <br>
> attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty <br>
> believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".<br>
> <br>
>> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you from<br>
>> > giving them names? ...<br>
>><br>
>> Time and money.<br>
> I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass media <br>
> or to get text books or dictionaries changed. I was just talking about <br>
> just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion here.<br>
> <br>
>> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of<br>
>> plurality is unnecessary.<br>
>><br>
>> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?<br>
> <br>
> I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read my <br>
> previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on the <br>
> voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).<br>
> <br>
> Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong Push-over <br>
> incentive.<br>
> <br>
>> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot<br>
>> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that point.<br>
>> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex<br>
>> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to Push-over<br>
>> > strategy.<br>
>><br>
>> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,<br>
>> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the<br>
>> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.<br>
>><br>
> For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited strict <br>
> ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively benign <br>
> way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In <br>
> Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as <br>
> "informal". Normally there should be nothing stopping you from ranking <br>
> the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.<br>
> <br>
>> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's not<br>
>> a "complex procedure":<br>
>><br>
>> <a href="https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp</a><br>
>> When shared preference levels are encountered,<br>
>> // the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,<br>
>> // not by splitting a ballot into fractional or<br>
>> // decimal portions. For example, during a<br>
>> // counting cycle, if there are two ballots that<br>
>> // rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same<br>
>> // highest ranking level, one of the ballots will<br>
>> // transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot<br>
>> // will transfer to candidate 2.<br>
>> //<br>
> <br>
> Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way, this <br>
> seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions <br>
> that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes <br>
> more than two candidates at the same ranking level?<br>
> <br>
> I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex procedure" I <br>
> referred is the one I, not you, suggest. I didn't bother describing it.<br>
> <br>
> I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or Benham, <br>
> then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one <br>
> candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the candidates <br>
> by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.<br>
> (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a third <br>
> of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would be fine for <br>
> this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next <br>
> eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over strategising <br>
> easier.) Then we count the equal top (among remaining candidates) <br>
> ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of the ones <br>
> they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional order. <br>
> (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was higher <br>
> in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)<br>
> <br>
> This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I think <br>
> you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing above-bottom <br>
> equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think there <br>
> would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't <br>
> advocate allowing it for those methods.<br>
> <br>
>> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were<br>
>> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,<br>
>> center-squeeze failures, etc.<br>
> It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods fail <br>
> IIA, so why are we even mentioning that? And isn't "center-squeeze" <br>
> just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the precise <br>
> definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?<br>
> <br>
> Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car <br>
> or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it <br>
> designed to only guard against another crash just like the most recent one.<br>
> <br>
> Chris B.<br>
> <br>
> *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at <a href="http://votefair.org" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">votefair.org</a> <br>
> <mailto:<a href="mailto:election-methods%2540lists.electorama.com" target="_blank">election-methods%40lists.electorama.com</a>?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%<a href="http://40votefair.org" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">40votefair.org</a>%3E><br>
> /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/<br>
> <br>
> <br>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
> <br>
> On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:<br>
> <br>
> > ... It is not garbage like STAR.<br>
> > ...<br>
> > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly<br>
> > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.<br>
> <br>
> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve<br>
> single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting is<br>
> not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.<br>
> <br>
> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you from<br>
> > giving them names? ...<br>
> <br>
> Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote, and<br>
> academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance<br>
> election-method reform.<br>
> <br>
> >> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to avoid it.<br>
> > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than with<br>
> > FPP. ...<br>
> <br>
> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of<br>
> plurality is unnecessary.<br>
> <br>
> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?<br>
> <br>
> >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls "overvotes."<br>
> >> RCIPE counts them correctly. ...<br>
> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot<br>
> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that point.<br>
> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex<br>
> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to Push-over<br>
> > strategy.<br>
> <br>
> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,<br>
> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the<br>
> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.<br>
> <br>
> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's not<br>
> a "complex procedure":<br>
> <br>
> <a href="https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp</a><br>
> <br>
> >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by<br>
> >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.<br>
> > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet failures, you<br>
> > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument "Let's<br>
> > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that we can<br>
> > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than<br>
> > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that<br>
> > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??<br>
> <br>
> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were<br>
> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,<br>
> center-squeeze failures, etc.<br>
> <br>
> I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about convoluted<br>
> scenarios that would never occur in a real election.<br>
> <br>
> Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you<br>
> really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.<br>
> <br>
> Richard Fobes<br>
> The VoteFair guy<br>
> <br>
> <br>
> ----<br>
> Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="https://electorama.com/em" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://electorama.com/em</a> for list info<br>
----<br>
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</blockquote></div>