[EM] Poll, preliminary ballots

[Closed Limelike Curves]

>
>
> *Consider the infamous Burlington and Alaska cases.  A voter doesn't want *
> *to see the full pairwise matrix to verify the official winner won every **one
> of those pairwise contests.*


> *Voters prefer to have fewer numbers to concentrate on when they are *

*looking for the winner.*


If you're giving an example with more than 3-4 candidates, you've messed up
regardless of the method. Otherwise, a pairwise matrix is easier to display
all at once, but only involves 3 to 6 comparisons (vs 3-4 for IRV). The
Burlington and 2022 Alaska Wikipedia pages include examples of
well-laid-out, easy-to-follow pairwise matrices.
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 9:20 PM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
electionmethods at votefair.org> wrote:

> On 4/24/2024 8:10 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>
>  > I can't see how looking for Condorcet losers is any way easier than
>  > looking for Condorcet winners.
>
> For a typical voter they don't want to look at a long list of pairwise
> counts to verify that a candidate has won every one of those pairwise
> contests.
>
> After eliminating the less popular candidates, and reaching the 3 or 4
> most popular candidates, a voter can more easily focus on the few
> remaining pairwise counts.
>
> Consider the infamous Burlington and Alaska cases.  A voter doesn't want
> to see the full pairwise matrix to verify the official winner won every
> one of those pairwise contests.
>
> Voters prefer to have fewer numbers to concentrate on when they are
> looking for the winner.
>
> The earlier rounds of elimination reduce that burden for them.
>
> That's a key advantage of the RCIPE method.  It's also part of why IRV
> is easier to "sell" to voters than any Condorcet method.
>
>
>  > Can anyone show us a single example in which RCIPE appears to give a
>  > better result (or in some way behave better than) Benham?
>
> It's easier to understand.  For voters.  As explained above.
>
> That's more important than analyzing fabricated scenarios.
>
>
> Richard Fobes
> The VoteFair guy
>
>
> On 4/24/2024 8:10 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
> >
> > Kevin,
> >
> >> The RCIPE advocate only asks for a rule change that seems modest and
> logical within the context of IRV: If the candidate was destined to lose
> *in IRV* anyway, then eliminate him sooner.
> >
> > Why?   All the IRV non-winners were "destined to lose", and the easiest
> > way to identify them is to complete the IRV count. That seems easier
> > than looking for Condorcet Losers.
> >
> >> In exchange, RCIPE achieves quite a lot.
> >
> > Really?  As a modification of IRV how much does it "achieve" in
> > comparison with what it loses?  Rescuing the occasional Condorcet winner
> > to make the method a lot more complicated and trash a lot of IRV's
> > popular criterion compliances??
> >
> > I can't see how looking for Condorcet losers is any way easier than
> > looking for Condorcet winners.  So why don't we just do that (before
> > each elimination, among the remaining candidates) instead?
> >
> > That method (Benham) is a Condorcet method and quite a bit simpler to
> > operate than RCIPE.    So the argument for RCIPE versus Benham is
> ...what??
> >
> > Can anyone show us a single example in which RCIPE appears to give a
> > better result (or in some way behave better than) Benham?
> >
> > Chris B.
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> *Kevin Venzke*stepjak at yahoo.fr
> >> <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
> ?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C815647778.5049429.1713951596021%
> 40mail.yahoo.com%3E>
> >> /Wed Apr 24 02:39:56 PDT 2024/
> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >> Hi Kristofer,
> >>
> >> Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de  <
> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com>>
> a écrit :
> >> >/What do you think of BTR-IRV in that respect? Or Borda-elimination?
> />/Neither explicitly checks for a Condorcet winner. /
> >> I don't think these are similar. The RCIPE advocate only asks for a
> rule change that
> >> seems modest and logical within the contoext of IRV: If the candidate
> was destined to
> >> lose *in IRV* anyway, then eliminate him soner. In exchange, RCIPE
> achieves quite a
> >> lot.
> >>
> >> With BTR-IRV I don't think any IRV fan will be persuaded, as it can't
> be explained
> >> why the bottom two candidates should challenge each other in a way that
> normally
> >> only occurs in IRV's final two. And if I put my Condorcet hat back on,
> I don't get
> >> it either, why it would make sense to arrive at Condorcet that way.
> >>
> >> >/Trying not to spam, but I also forgot to say: Copeland-elimination
> />/should be Condorcet and it works like RCIPE in the absence of any lower
> />/cycles. (Break the tie by first preference count when there is a cycle.)
> /
> >> Sure. I think there is a world where RCIPE is the right thing to
> advocate, and
> >> that's the cleverness I see there. But this could also be true for
> Copeland
> >> elimination.
> >>
> >> Kevin
> >> votingmethods.net
> >
> ----
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> info
>
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