[EM] Poll, preliminary ballots

Richard, the VoteFair guy electionmethods at votefair.org
Wed Apr 24 21:19:40 PDT 2024


On 4/24/2024 8:10 AM, Chris Benham wrote:

 > I can't see how looking for Condorcet losers is any way easier than
 > looking for Condorcet winners.

For a typical voter they don't want to look at a long list of pairwise 
counts to verify that a candidate has won every one of those pairwise 
contests.

After eliminating the less popular candidates, and reaching the 3 or 4 
most popular candidates, a voter can more easily focus on the few 
remaining pairwise counts.

Consider the infamous Burlington and Alaska cases.  A voter doesn't want 
to see the full pairwise matrix to verify the official winner won every 
one of those pairwise contests.

Voters prefer to have fewer numbers to concentrate on when they are 
looking for the winner.

The earlier rounds of elimination reduce that burden for them.

That's a key advantage of the RCIPE method.  It's also part of why IRV 
is easier to "sell" to voters than any Condorcet method.


 > Can anyone show us a single example in which RCIPE appears to give a
 > better result (or in some way behave better than) Benham?

It's easier to understand.  For voters.  As explained above.

That's more important than analyzing fabricated scenarios.


Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy


On 4/24/2024 8:10 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
> 
> Kevin,
> 
>> The RCIPE advocate only asks for a rule change that seems modest and logical within the context of IRV: If the candidate was destined to lose *in IRV* anyway, then eliminate him sooner.
> 
> Why?   All the IRV non-winners were "destined to lose", and the easiest 
> way to identify them is to complete the IRV count. That seems easier 
> than looking for Condorcet Losers.
> 
>> In exchange, RCIPE achieves quite a lot.
> 
> Really?  As a modification of IRV how much does it "achieve" in 
> comparison with what it loses?  Rescuing the occasional Condorcet winner 
> to make the method a lot more complicated and trash a lot of IRV's 
> popular criterion compliances??
> 
> I can't see how looking for Condorcet losers is any way easier than 
> looking for Condorcet winners.  So why don't we just do that (before 
> each elimination, among the remaining candidates) instead?
> 
> That method (Benham) is a Condorcet method and quite a bit simpler to 
> operate than RCIPE.    So the argument for RCIPE versus Benham is ...what??
> 
> Can anyone show us a single example in which RCIPE appears to give a 
> better result (or in some way behave better than) Benham?
> 
> Chris B.
> 
>>
>>
>> *Kevin Venzke*stepjak at yahoo.fr 
>> <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C815647778.5049429.1713951596021%40mail.yahoo.com%3E>
>> /Wed Apr 24 02:39:56 PDT 2024/
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> Hi Kristofer,
>>
>> Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de  <http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com>> a écrit :
>> >/What do you think of BTR-IRV in that respect? Or Borda-elimination? />/Neither explicitly checks for a Condorcet winner. /
>> I don't think these are similar. The RCIPE advocate only asks for a rule change that
>> seems modest and logical within the contoext of IRV: If the candidate was destined to
>> lose *in IRV* anyway, then eliminate him soner. In exchange, RCIPE achieves quite a
>> lot.
>>
>> With BTR-IRV I don't think any IRV fan will be persuaded, as it can't be explained
>> why the bottom two candidates should challenge each other in a way that normally
>> only occurs in IRV's final two. And if I put my Condorcet hat back on, I don't get
>> it either, why it would make sense to arrive at Condorcet that way.
>>
>> >/Trying not to spam, but I also forgot to say: Copeland-elimination />/should be Condorcet and it works like RCIPE in the absence of any lower />/cycles. (Break the tie by first preference count when there is a cycle.) /
>> Sure. I think there is a world where RCIPE is the right thing to advocate, and
>> that's the cleverness I see there. But this could also be true for Copeland
>> elimination.
>>
>> Kevin
>> votingmethods.net
> 


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