[EM] "Double Defeat, Hare" poll candidate

[Michael Garman]

You’re not helping your cause with comments like that, Mike.

Just four days ago, you wrote “I’m not an Internet attack-person.” What
difference half a week makes :-D


On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 6:54 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> I didn’t quit in rage, twit, I quit in disgust when I ran out of patience
> with zero progress due to Dunning-Kruger exemplars like you.
>
> On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 02:43 Michael Garman <
> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>
>> Is the poll still happening? I thought Ossipoff cancelled it when he rage
>> quit the forum.
>> On Tue, Apr 16, 2024 at 4:50 PM Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> I would like to nominate  Double Defeat, Hare.
>>>
>>> *Voters strictly rank from the top however many candidates they wish and
>>> also may specify an approval cutoff.
>>>
>>> Default approval is only goes to top-ranked candidates.
>>>
>>> All candidates that are pairwise beaten by a more approved candidate are
>>> disqualified.
>>>
>>> If that leaves more than one qualified (i.e. not disqualified)
>>> candidate, commence eliminations according to Hare
>>> rules until only one qualified candidate remains.*
>>>
>>> This is a compromise between Hare and Condorcet which will probably not
>>> please the fundamentalist supporters of either,
>>> because it doesn't meet the Condorcet criterion and is more complicated
>>> than Hare and fails Later-no-Harm and Later-no-Help.
>>>
>>> But it addresses the concern some have about electing a weak low social
>>> utility Condorcet winner, and I think it might simulate
>>> well.
>>>
>>>
>>> I think that methods that allow voters to both rank the candidates and
>>> specify an approval threshold/cutoff
>>> should never elect a candidate that is pairwise beaten by a more
>>> approved candidate.
>>>
>>> I coined this criterion as "Double Defeat" and it occurred to me that it
>>> could be a disqualification device that
>>> is part of a method.
>>>
>>> Some people are wary of Condorcet electing a "weak centrist" candidate,
>>> for example
>>>
>>> 49 A>>>C>B
>>> 48 B>>>C>A
>>> 03 C>A>>>B
>>>
>>> Assuming all voters get the same utility from electing their favourites,
>>> the Hare (and FPP and presumably Approval)
>>> winner is the highest Social Utility candidate A.
>>>
>>> With those sincere preferences, the ranking-with-specified-approval
>>> ballots would be
>>>
>>> 49 A|>C
>>> 48 B|>C
>>> 03 C>A|
>>>
>>> Here the Double Defeat rule doesn't interfere with Hare.  B is
>>> disqualified because B is pairwise beaten by the more approved A.
>>>
>>> So then, following Hare rules C is eliminated leaving A as the only
>>> qualified candidate and so winner.
>>>
>>> The C>A voters have no real complaint other than "The method should meet
>>> the Condorcet criterion" and any complaint from
>>> the B>C voters is answered by "To get a result you prefer you didn't
>>> have to order-reverse, you could have had A disqualified by
>>> approving C".
>>>
>>> The method is similar in spirit to an "Approval-enhanced Hare" that
>>> arose from discussion I had here a few months ago with Forest,
>>> but which I forgot about and didn't rediscover until after nominations
>>> for the poll had closed:
>>>
>>> *Elect the most approved member of the set comprising the Hare winner
>>> and all the candidates with a beat-path to the Hare winner.*
>>>
>>> 49 A (sincere might be A>B)
>>> 24 B (sincere might be B>C)
>>> 27 C>B
>>>
>>> A classic example that has been interpreted as Hare and Margins by
>>> electing A failing Minimal Defense and avoidably causing the C voters to
>>> regret
>>> not Compromising, and alternatively by electing B the C>B voters having
>>> been taken advantage of by the B voters using a Defection strategy, a
>>> failure
>>> of the Chicken Dilemma criterion.
>>>
>>> In this example it is true that in all the methods that meet Double
>>> Defeat it is up to the C>B voters to decide which is more important for
>>> them:
>>> preventing the election of their greater evil A, or preventing being
>>> taken advantage of by Defecting B voters.
>>>
>>> Chris B.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>> info
>>>
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
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