[EM] "Double Defeat, Hare" poll candidate

[Michael Ossipoff]

I didn’t quit in rage, twit, I quit in disgust when I ran out of patience
with zero progress due to Dunning-Kruger exemplars like you.

On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 02:43 Michael Garman <michael.garman at rankthevote.us>
wrote:

> Is the poll still happening? I thought Ossipoff cancelled it when he rage
> quit the forum.
> On Tue, Apr 16, 2024 at 4:50 PM Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
> wrote:
>
>>
>> I would like to nominate  Double Defeat, Hare.
>>
>> *Voters strictly rank from the top however many candidates they wish and
>> also may specify an approval cutoff.
>>
>> Default approval is only goes to top-ranked candidates.
>>
>> All candidates that are pairwise beaten by a more approved candidate are
>> disqualified.
>>
>> If that leaves more than one qualified (i.e. not disqualified)
>> candidate, commence eliminations according to Hare
>> rules until only one qualified candidate remains.*
>>
>> This is a compromise between Hare and Condorcet which will probably not
>> please the fundamentalist supporters of either,
>> because it doesn't meet the Condorcet criterion and is more complicated
>> than Hare and fails Later-no-Harm and Later-no-Help.
>>
>> But it addresses the concern some have about electing a weak low social
>> utility Condorcet winner, and I think it might simulate
>> well.
>>
>>
>> I think that methods that allow voters to both rank the candidates and
>> specify an approval threshold/cutoff
>> should never elect a candidate that is pairwise beaten by a more approved
>> candidate.
>>
>> I coined this criterion as "Double Defeat" and it occurred to me that it
>> could be a disqualification device that
>> is part of a method.
>>
>> Some people are wary of Condorcet electing a "weak centrist" candidate,
>> for example
>>
>> 49 A>>>C>B
>> 48 B>>>C>A
>> 03 C>A>>>B
>>
>> Assuming all voters get the same utility from electing their favourites,
>> the Hare (and FPP and presumably Approval)
>> winner is the highest Social Utility candidate A.
>>
>> With those sincere preferences, the ranking-with-specified-approval
>> ballots would be
>>
>> 49 A|>C
>> 48 B|>C
>> 03 C>A|
>>
>> Here the Double Defeat rule doesn't interfere with Hare.  B is
>> disqualified because B is pairwise beaten by the more approved A.
>>
>> So then, following Hare rules C is eliminated leaving A as the only
>> qualified candidate and so winner.
>>
>> The C>A voters have no real complaint other than "The method should meet
>> the Condorcet criterion" and any complaint from
>> the B>C voters is answered by "To get a result you prefer you didn't have
>> to order-reverse, you could have had A disqualified by
>> approving C".
>>
>> The method is similar in spirit to an "Approval-enhanced Hare" that arose
>> from discussion I had here a few months ago with Forest,
>> but which I forgot about and didn't rediscover until after nominations
>> for the poll had closed:
>>
>> *Elect the most approved member of the set comprising the Hare winner and
>> all the candidates with a beat-path to the Hare winner.*
>>
>> 49 A (sincere might be A>B)
>> 24 B (sincere might be B>C)
>> 27 C>B
>>
>> A classic example that has been interpreted as Hare and Margins by
>> electing A failing Minimal Defense and avoidably causing the C voters to
>> regret
>> not Compromising, and alternatively by electing B the C>B voters having
>> been taken advantage of by the B voters using a Defection strategy, a
>> failure
>> of the Chicken Dilemma criterion.
>>
>> In this example it is true that in all the methods that meet Double
>> Defeat it is up to the C>B voters to decide which is more important for
>> them:
>> preventing the election of their greater evil A, or preventing being
>> taken advantage of by Defecting B voters.
>>
>> Chris B.
>>
>>
>>
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20240417/58ab2ed6/attachment.htm>